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VI 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: When it was undisputed that Plaintiff Eagle Mountain City brought suit in 
its own name, sought compensation for the actual and very real harm it suffered, and 
maintained exclusive control over the litigation, did the district court err when it granted 
Defendant Parsons Kinghorn & Harris, P.C.'s ("PKH") motion for summary judgment by 
concluding, based merely on agreement recitals, that the City's pre-suit agreement to 
share proceeds from any potential recovery from PKH constituted a partial, implied 
assignment in violation of Utah's public policies? 
Standard of Review: An appeal of a summary judgment decision is considered 
"under a de nova standard of review, granting no deference to the district court's 
analysis." L.C. Canyon Partners. L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2011 UT 63, ,-i 8, 266 P.3d 
797. ''A trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular deference; we review 
them for correctness." Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
Whether a party receives something "by assignment ... is a question of law that [the 
Utah Supreme Court] review[s] for correctness, incorporating a clearly erroneous 
standard of review for ... subsidiary factual determinations." Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 
24, ,-i 38, 44 P.3d 742 (abrogated on other grounds by RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, 
i-135, 96 P.3d 935). 
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Preservation: (R. 2724-35 (8/17/2015 Hearing Tr. at 22: 18-33:22), 3426-3451.) 
Issue 2: Did the district court err in depriving the City of the trial counsel of 
its choice nearly two years into the litigation by ruling, without any motion to disqualify, 
that the City could not use counsel "associated" with a non-party to the litigation, Cedar 
Valley Water Company ("Cedar Valley")? 
Standard of Review: Appellate review of a district court's findings concerning 
the existence of an alleged conflict in a law firm's representation "involve mixed 
questions of fact and law which, on review, do not require the deference due to findings 
on questions of pure fact." Margulies By and Through Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 
1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). "[T]he proper standard of review of that portion of the trial 
court's order which allow[s] [a law firm] to remain as counsel in [a] malpractice action is 
the abuse of discretion standard." Id. The Utah Supreme Court, "however, has a special 
interest in the administration of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the discretion 
granted to the trial court in matters of disqualification is quite limited when there are no 
factual disputes." Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003 UT 39, ~ 8, 78 P.3d 
603. 
Preservation: (R. 2724 (8/17/2015 Hearing Tr. at 22:5-17), 3428.) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 3, 2009, Cedar Valley, represented by Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. ("Snell & 
Wilmer"), brought a lawsuit against the City as Cedar Valley Water Company, LLC v. 
Eagle Mountain City, et. al, Case No. 090402122 (the "Underlying Lawsuit"). In the 
Underlying Lawsuit, Cedar Valley alleged that the City breached a contract known as the 
2000 Town Well #1 Capacity Purchase Agreement (the "Capacity Purchase 
Agreement"). PKH had served as the City's counsel since before that agreement, advising 
the City concerning it and administering it on behalf of the City. 
At the trial of the Underlying Lawsuit, Cedar Valley intended to show damages 
exceeding $8 million. In the weeks prior to trial, trial counsel for the City, Williams & 
Hunt ("WH") advised the City that PKH's advice and administration of the Capacity 
Purchase Agreement was likely legal malpractice, and had subjected the City to millions 
of dollars in liability. Shortly before the trial scheduled in February 2013, Cedar Valley 
and the City settled the Underlying Lawsuit. In connection with this settlement, Cedar 
Valley and the City executed a settlement agreement dated February 5, 2013 (the 
"Settlement Agreement"). Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the City agreed to pay 
Cedar Valley more than $4.5 million over time. 
Because the City desired to pursue claims against PKH in order to recoup the 
losses resulting from the Underlying Litigation, the City, Cedar Valley, and Snell & 
Wilmer executed a Contingent Fee Agreement, incorporated by reference into the 
Settlement Agreement. Pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement, the City agreed to 
share a third of any recovery with Cedar Valley. Also, because Snell & Wilmer had years 
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of familiarity with the facts and legal issues in the matter, the City selected it to represent 
the City in the claims against PKH, and also agreed to share a third of any recovery with 
Snell & Wilmer. 
On December 10, 2013, the City filed this lawsuit against PKH. PKH was already 
aware of the terms of both the Settlement Agreement and the Contingent Fee Agreement 
before the City brought its claims. PKH waited over a year to argue that the Settlement 
Agreement and Contingent Fee Agreement amounted to an improper assignment of the 
City's malpractice claim, and on February 13, 2015, after a year of extensive and 
expensive discovery, PKH filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a dismissal of 
the City's claims. On October 2, 2015, the district court granted PKH's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed the City's claims without prejudice. The district court 
concluded that the agreements constituted a "partial," implied assignment of control of 
the City's malpractice claims to Cedar Valley because under the agreements (1) Cedar 
Valley had a right to seek an independent determination of the reasonableness of any 
settlement the City was inclined to accept and (2) Cedar Valley had an interest in any 
recovery from PKH. The district court determined that malpractice claims are not 
assignable under Utah law as a matter of public policy. The district court further held that 
the City could renew its claims against PKH only if the litigation was not controlled in 
any way by Cedar Valley and the City was not represented by attorneys associated with 
Cedar Valley. The City now appeals the district court's ruling. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The City filed its Complaint with the district court on December 10, 2013, seeking 
damages for PKH' s (i) negligence and gross negligence in breaching the standard of care, 
(ii) breach of its fiduciary duties, and (iii) breach of contract (collectively, the "Claims"). 
(R. 1-24.) The City's Claims arose from the legal advice and contract administration the 
City received from its counsel, PKH, related to the Capacity Purchase Agreement 
between the City and Cedar Valley. 
A. The City Agrees to Purchase a Well and Water Capacity from 
Cedar Valley. 
In or about July 1997, the City entered into a "Water Agency and Equity 
Participation Agreement" with Cedar Valley ("1997 Agreement"). (R. 3630-47.) Under 
the 1997 Agreement, Cedar Valley was the exclusive water agent for the City. In 1998, 
PKH, as counsel for the City, approached Cedar Valley about entering into a new 
agreement to replace the 1997 Agreement. Ultimately, Cedar Valley and the City entered 
into the Capacity Purchase Agreement dated February 15, 2000, wherein Cedar Valley 
agreed to sell its well ('"Well # 1 ") and all of the remaining water capacity in Well # 1 to 
the City. (R. 3658-76.) The Capacity Purchase Agreement reflected the parties' 
agreement that the value of the remaining water capacity was $3,539,000.00. (R. 3661 at 
,-i 6.) As a means of funding this purchase over a period of years, the City agreed it would 
collect impact fees from developers whose building lots would connect to the City's 
water system and would, as a result, use water from Well #1. (R. 3660-61 at ,-i,-i 3-6.) The 
Capacity Purchase Agreement specified that the City "shall collect an impact fee of 
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$720.00 for each equivalent residential unit of capacity as provided in the 2000 Impact 
Fee Ordinance of the Town and under the terms of this Agreement." (R. 3661 at if 5.) 
Importantly, the City's obligation to pay the $3.5 million to Cedar Valley was not 
dependent on its collections and existed independently of amounts collected. (R. 3360-
64.) In other words, the City owed the money even if it failed to collect it from others. 
B. PKH Advised the City Not to Collect Impact Fees as Required 
by the Capacity Purchase Agreement. 
Subsequent to the signing of the Capacity Purchase Agreement, PKH advised the 
City that-despite the language of the Capacity Purchase Agreement-it was not actually 
obligated to collect water impact fees from developers, and should not remit any monies 
to Cedar Valley. (See, e.g., R. 3409-11 at if 16 (citing R. 3504-24, 3605-19, 3526-51), if 
17 (citing R. 3722-29), if 18 (citing R. 3731-34, 3590-3600, 3526-51, 3736), if 19 (citing 
R. 3738, 3526-51, 3740-41, 3743-44, 3746-47, 3749-50), if 23 (citing R. 3785).) The 
City contends this advice was negligent, a breach of the standard of care, and a breach of 
PKH's fiduciary duties. (R. 19-22.) Specifically, the City alleged that PKH breached its 
professional duties by (i) advising the City not to collect impact fees from developers 
despite clear and express contractual language directing the City to do so, (ii) advising 
the City not to pay any monies to Cedar Valley notwithstanding the fact that PKH 
acknowledged at least some monies were owed and in fact some monies had been 
collected, (iii) advising the City that credit letters from Cedar Valley existed to support 
the City's defenses against Cedar Valley's claims when, in fact, such letters did not exist, 
and (iv) advising the City against accepting a settlement offer from Cedar Valley before 
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the Underlying Lawsuit, for reasons unsupported by facts or law, that would have 
substantially reduced the City's potential liability and exposure. (R. 19 at if 66.) 
Between 2000 and 2007, Cedar Valley made repeated inquiries to PKH and the 
City about the status of payments under the Capacity Purchase Agreement. (R. 11.) 
Finally, in July 2007, Cedar Valley filed a ORAMA request and discovered that the City 
had been using Well # 1 as a primary water source for the City for years, and had pumped 
billions of gallons of water from it without making a single payment to Cedar Valley. (R. 
12.) Between 2007 and 2009, Cedar Valley engaged in discussions with the City in an 
effort to resolve the parties' dispute over payment. (Id., R. 3411 if 24 (citing R. 3458-65, 
3787-89).) During these negotiations, PKH repeatedly advised the City that it had no 
obligation to collect impact fees or to make payments to Cedar Valley under the Capacity 
Purchase Agreement. (See. e.g., R. 3411-14 if 25 (citing R. 3787-89, 3791-92, 3653-56, 
3795-97), if 26 (citing R. 3799-3807, 3526-51), if 27 (citing R. 3809-10), if 28 (citing R. 
3812-26), if 29 (citing R. 3812-26, 3458-65, 3605-19), if 30 (citing R. 3828-33, 3835-39, 
3841-43, 3845-47, 3605-19, 3415), if 31 (citing R. 3835-39, 3812-26), if 32 (citing R. 
3849-51).) After the parties failed to reach a resolution, in June 2009, Cedar Valley filed 
the Underlying Lawsuit against the City. (R. 2801-23.) 
C. The City Executes the Settlement Agreement and Contingent 
Fee Agreement with Cedar Valley. 
Trial of Cedar Valley's claims against the City was scheduled for February 2013. 
Shortly before trial, in January 2013, Cedar Valley and the City settled the Underlying 
Lawsuit and entered into the Settlement Agreement. (R. 3360-63; Add. 1.) The City's 
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trial counsel recommended the settlement by reason that PKH' s advice and 
misrepresentations to the City had made a defense to Cedar Valley's claims untenable. 
The Settlement Agreement incorporated by reference the Contingent Fee Agreement. (R. 
3362.) The City and Cedar Valley entered into the Contingent Fee Agreement with Snell 
& Wilmer, who had acted as counsel for Cedar Valley in the Underlying Lawsuit, had 
extensive knowledge of the facts and history, and had essentially uncovered PKH's 
negligence and malpractice. (R. 3365-73; Add. 2.) Pursuant to the Contingent Fee 
Agreement, the City agreed to share with Cedar Valley a portion of the proceeds from 
any recovery of the City's planned lawsuit against PKH. (Id.) Under the Contingent Fee 
Agreement, Snell & Wilmer agreed to represent the City in its malpractice case against 
PKH. (Id. at Preamble and ,-iii D, E, 1.) 
D. The City Sues PKH for Malpractice. 
The City tried to settle its claims against PKH before bringing suit. In those 
discussions the City disclosed to PKH the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the 
Contingent Fee Agreement. After a failed mediation (R. 3319-23), on December 10, 2013 
the City brought this lawsuit. (R. 1-24.) The suit asserted claims for professional 
negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. (Id.) The City alleged that 
PKH provided negligent advice to the City about the collection of impact fees and the 
payment of monies due to Cedar Valley under the Capacity Purchase Agreement. (R. 19 
at if 66.) The City further alleged that PKH had a duty of honesty and candor to the City 
and breached that duty when it falsely advised the City that written credit letters existed 
to support the City's primary defense against Cedar Valley. PKH knew that no such 
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credit letters existed. (R. 21 at if 76.)1 The City also alleged that PKH had a contractual 
obligation to provide competent legal advice and that PKH breached that obligation when 
it gave incorrect legal advice related to the City's performance under the Capacity 
Purchase Agreement. (R. 23 at if 84.) 
After the City filed its Complaint, PKH brought a third-party complaint against 
WH alleging that, as litigation counsel of record for the City in the Underlying Lawsuit, 
WH was negligent in its representation of the City and responsible for the damages 
incurred by the City in settling with Cedar Valley. (R. 141-67.) 
E. PKH Moves for Summary Judgment. 
In spite of being aware of the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Contingent 
Fee Agreement at the time of suit, PKH did not move at that time to dismiss the City's 
complaint on any grounds, including on the basis of a purported partial or other 
assignment allegedly in violation of public policy. PKH and the City engaged in 
expensive discovery for over a year. (R. 3426 at if 84.) Prior to the conclusion of fact 
discovery, on February 13, 2015, PKH filed its Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a 
dismissal of the City's claims on the purported ground that the City improperly assigned 
its malpractice claim under the Settlement Agreement and Contingent Fee Agreement. 
(R. 3065-3373.) Specifically, PKH claimed that pursuant to these agreements Cedar 
Valley obtained a substantial interest in the legal malpractice case and that the legal 
1 Under the Capacity Purchase Agreement, Cedar Valley was permitted to assign a credit 
against the equity buy-in capacity for Well #1 to third-party developers. In the event 
Cedar Valley elected to do so (which it never did), Cedar Valley was to provide written 
notice to the City that it was not to charge impact fees to those third-party developers. 
(R. 3660-61.) 
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malpractice claiin was somehow used as a marketable commodity. (R. 3094-95.) 
Although Cedar Valley is not a party, PKH also claimed it was being forced to defend 
itself against an entity with which it never had an attorney-client relationship, and to 
which it owed no duty. (Id.) Finally, PKH claimed "champerty" was promoted because 
Cedar Valley had agreed to pay the costs of litigation, and that Snell & Wilmer's 
involvement in the case was improper. (Id.; see also R. 3107.) PKH, however, never 
filed a motion to disqualify Snell & Wilmer as counsel for the City and lodged no 
objection to Snell & Wilmer's involvement in the case for well over a year. In support of 
its arguments, PKH relied on the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Contingent Fee 
Agreement. (R. 3068-3108, 4081-4159.) 
In opposition to PKH' s motion, the City pointed out there was no assignment and 
that the language of the agreements did not support PKH's arguments. (R. 3426-29.) 
Moreover, aside from paying costs, it was undisputed that Cedar Valley had absolutely 
no involvement, let alone control, over the litigation against PKH. (R. 3427-28; R. 3832 
at ifif 18-19 (Add. 3); R. 3951 at ifif 4-5 (Add. 4); R. 3957-58 at ifif 17-19 (Add. 5).) It 
was also undisputed that the City never received a settlement offer from PKH that it was 
inclined to accept. (R. 3832 at if 21; R. 3951 at if 5; R. 3957-58 at ifif 18-19.) Finally, 
Snell & Wilmer's representation of the City posed no conflict. (R. 3426-35.) The City 
submitted declarations to support these facts, none of which were addressed or rebutted 
by PKH. (See, e.g., R. 3831 at if 14 ("[T]he City never intended to transfer or assign the 
[legal malpractice] claim, or control over the claim to [Cedar Valley]."); id. ("[I]t was 
always my understanding that the City would bring the claims and control the 
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litigation."); id. at ir 15 ("The City agreed to using Snell & Wilmer because Snell & 
Wilmer was the logical choice . . . [because] it was already well acquainted with the 
complicated facts of the underlying case and the documents related thereto."); id. at ir 16 
("The City Attorney at the time of the settlement, Jeremy Cook from PKH, never 
indicated ... that an agreement to share proceeds with [Cedar Valley] of a malpractice 
claim would be improper or voidable.").) Instead, PKH (and ultimately the district court) 
ignored the declarations and the undisputed facts contained therein. 
F. The District Court Grants PK.H's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Precludes the City from Using Snell & Wilmer. 
On October 2, 2015, the district court issued its Ruling, wherein it granted PK.H's 
motion for summary judgment and dismissed the City's claims without prejudice. (R. 
2626-42; Add. 6.) The district court expressly advised the parties it was not ruling that 
the Settlement Agreement or the Contingent Fee Agreement were unenforceable. (Id. at 
7.) The district court did, however, conclude that the agreements constituted a partial, 
implied assignment of the City's malpractice claims to Cedar Valley because the 
agreements granted Cedar Valley the right to question whether a settlement was 
reasonable, allowed Cedar Valley to advance costs, and granted Cedar Valley a one-third 
interest in any proceeds recovered in the litigation. (Id. at 15-16.) The district court 
opined that legal malpractice claims were not assignable and that, as a consequence, the 
agreements violated public policy. (Id.) The district court concluded that the City was 
prohibited from pursuing its claims against PKH under terms of the agreements and that 
the City would be "permitted to pursue its claim against PKH [only] if it satisfies the 
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Court that it will be prosecuted independently of the settlement agreement. To do so, at a 
minimum, [the City] needs to establish that its litigation is not controlled in any way by 
[Cedar Valley], and that [the City] is not represented by attorneys associated with [Cedar 
Valley]." (Id. at 16.) 
In reaching its conclusion that the Contingent Fee Agreement granted Cedar 
Valley enough control over the City's malpractice claim to constitute an improper 
assignment, the district court identified the following provisions from the Contingent Fee 
Agreement: 
• The City's agreement to "file and prosecute a complaint against PKH . . . 
solely on the terms and conditions of this Agreement" (R. 2633 (citing R. 3365)); 
• The City and Cedar Valley agreeing to retain Snell & Wilmer to bring the 
lawsuit against PKH (Id. (citing R. 3365)); 
• The communications between the City and Cedar Valley and Snell & 
Wilmer are not privileged because the parties are jointly represented (Id. (citing R. 3367-
68)); 
• The City and Cedar Valley agreed that each would receive one-third of any 
recovery from PKH in the malpractice lawsuit (Id. (citing R. 3365)); 
• The City and Cedar Valley agreed that Snell & Wilmer would receive one-
third of any recovery from PKH in the malpractice lawsuit (Id. (citing R. 3366)); 
• Cedar Valley would pay all costs incurred in connection with the 
malpractice lawsuit (Id. (citing R. 3366)); and 
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• If PKH made an offer to settle and the City and Cedar Valley could not 
agree on the terms of the settlement, the City and Cedar Valley were required to negotiate 
in good faith. If the City and Cedar Valley could not agree, then they agreed to mediate. 
If mediation was unsuccessful, the question of whether to accept or reject PK.H's offer 
would be submitted to an arbitration panel. (Id. at 2633-34 (citing R. 3369).) 
The district court then surmised that the Settlement Agreement and Contingent 
Fee Agreement granted "partial control" to Cedar Valley in the following ways: 
I) File the present lawsuit as a condition to settle the underlying litigation. 
2) Be represented by a specific attorney agreed to by [Cedar Valley]. 3) 
Allow the attorney to jointly represent [the City and Cedar Valley] in this 
case. 4) Waive client confidentiality with the attorney in this case to allow 
[Snell & Wilmer] to disclose information regarding the litigation to [Cedar 
Valley]. 5) Obtain prior approval by [Cedar Valley] before it can settle the 
claim, or if the parties disagree, ultimately submit its rights to settle its case 
to binding arbitration. 
(R. 2634.) 
Eagle Mountain filed its notice of appeal on November 2, 2015. (R. 2669-71.) 
Thereafter, the district court entered an order dismissing without prejudice PKH' s First 
Amended Third-Party Complaint against WH. (R. 2689-91.) Lastly, this litigation has 
not permanently destroyed the attorney-client relationship, as the City continues to use 
PKH as its City Attorney on many matters. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Utah has not yet decided whether legal malpractice claims are assignable. And 
while Utah law permits the purchase of such claims from bankrupt estates and judgment 
execution sales, this Court need not address the specific question because the City did not 
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assign its claims as a matter of law. The City has paid out millions, and continues to pay 
out hundreds of thousands of dollars because PKH committed malpractice. The City 
seeks those monies from PKH, whose negligence and bad advice led to a completely 
avoidable liability. In agreeing to share a portion of any recovery with Cedar Valley in 
exchange for payment of costs, and with Snell & Wilmer in exchange for legal services, 
Cedar Valley did not assign its claims against PKH or surrender control of the litigation. 
The district court recognized that neither the Settlement Agreement nor the 
Contingent Fee Agreement expressly assigned or surrendered control of the City's legal 
malpractice claim against PKH. The Court went on from those agreements, however, to 
erroneously opine that the City transferred its legal malpractice claim through a partial, 
implied assignment. In so doing, the Court attributed motives and conduct that the 
language of the agreements, the undisputed facts, and certainly all reasonable inferences 
therefrom, do not support. The City was the sole plaintiff. It filed suit in its own name, 
through attorneys the City selected because of their depth of knowledge and experience 
with the claims and many years of history at issue. The City was authorized to and in fact 
controlled every aspect of the litigation. The undisputed facts showed that Cedar Valley's 
sole role in the prosecution of claims was to pay litigation costs, over which it had no 
discretion. Most importantly here, while Utah law has not embraced all of the public 
policy reasons against assignments that other states have embraced, none of those public 
policy reasons are implicated by the facts of this case. The City did not transfer its legal 
malpractice claims - through an implied assignment or otherwise - but even if there were 
some sort of partial transfer here, it did not violate the public policy reasons with which 
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Utah is concerned and should, therefore, be deemed valid. Thus this Court should reverse 
the district court's decision. 
Finally, the district court erred when it embraced PKH's one sentence argument 
and improperly held that the City could pursue its legal malpractice claim only so long as 
it was not represented by attorneys "associated" with Cedar Valley. The district court's 
holding purportedly disqualified Snell & Wilmer from representing the City despite the 
fact that a motion to disqualify was never filed, the district court never considered facts 
requiring disqualification, and the district court never requested that the matter be briefed. 
The district court's decision infringed on the City's right to select the counsel of its 
choice and could unfairly prejudice the City by forcing it to find new counsel, who must 
get up to speed in a case that has over six years of history between the Underlying 
Lawsuit and this case. The district court's depriving the City of its counsel of choice 
nearly two years into the litigation was prejudicial error, and this Court should reverse it. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND CONTINGENT FEE 
AGREEMENT CONSTITUTED A PARTIAL, IMPLIED 
ASSIGNMENT OF THE CITY'S LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM. 
The district court incorrectly concluded that the City improperly transferred its 
legal malpractice claim against PKH through the Settlement Agreement and Contingent 
Fee Agreement. The district court's conclusion ignored the undisputed facts, and all 
reasonable inferences favoring the City, and instead was based on its erroneous 
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determination that the agreements constituted a partial, implied assignment as a matter of 
law. 
A. Utah Law Sanctions Non-Clients Suing Lawyers for 
Malpractice. 
The Utah Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a legal malpractice claim is 
assignable under Utah law. See Snow. Nuffer. Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 1999 UT 
49, ~ 8, 980 P.2d 208 ("[T]here is no net(d to decide whether a legal malpractice claim is 
assignable under Utah law in order to resolve this particular dispute."). While the Utah 
Supreme Court did not reach that specific issue in the Tanasse case, it did expressly 
sanction the purchase of a legal malpractice claim from a bankruptcy estate, or in 
executing upon a judgment. Id. at ~~ 10-11. In other words, under Utah law, a total 
stranger to an attorney-client relationship may own the client's malpractice claim, control 
it, and prosecute it against that party's lawyer or law firm, and keep 100% of the 
recovery. Thus, Utah has not embraced all public policy issues identified by other courts 
as important or essential to the assignability issue. The present case, however, does not 
require this Court to delineate the types of transfers of claims that are or are not 
permissible because there was no transfer or implied assignment of the City's claims 
against PKH. 
1. "Assignment" is a vague term that invokes a broad range of 
circumstances. 
As the City pointed out to the district court, there is an entire range of 
circumstances that would give rise to whether a malpractice claim has been "assigned" in 
such a way as to violate Utah's public policies. (R. 3436-51.) And, the City 
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acknowledged that the majority of courts that have considered the issue have held that at 
least at some levels, legal malpractice claims should not be assigned. (R. 3432-35.) The 
City did not dispute the proposition that the Utah Supreme Court would likely adopt the 
idea that in some circumstances the transfer of a legal malpractice claim for consideration 
could violate some important public policies, and thus be barred. (Id.); see. e.g., Tanasse 
v. Snow, 929 P.2d 351, 352-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that the majority of 
jurisdictions have determined that legal malpractice claims cannot be assigned, but 
recognizing that a small minority, including New York, Maryland, Oregon, and 
Pennsylvania, have held that legal malpractice claims are freely assignable), aff d in part, 
rev'd in part on other grounds, Tanasse, 1999 UT 49. 
2. There is no need here to flesh out Utah law on assignments. 
Here, however, just as in Tanasse, the Court need not decide whether legal 
malpractice claims are assignable under Utah law because the City did not assign its legal 
malpractice claim against PKH to Cedar Valley. Instead, the City entered into a 
Settlement Agreement with Cedar Valley, (R. 3360-63), and a Contingent Fee Agreement 
with Cedar Valley and Snell & Wilmer, (R. 3365-73). It is undisputed that, as a matter of 
law, and as the district court recognized, neither agreement expressly assigned the City's 
legal malpractice claim to Cedar Valley. To the contrary, in releasing its claims against 
Cedar Valley, the City "[ e ]xpressly excluded from this Release ... any and all claims the 
City may have against its own attorneys, as set forth in the Contingent Fee Agreement." 
(R. 3361 at if 5.) Thus, not only did the City not assign its legal malpractice claim, it 
expressly retained it. 
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Similarly, the Contingent Fee Agreement, which was incorporated by reference 
into the Settlement Agreement, does not include a single provision wherein the City 
expressly assigned its malpractice claim to Cedar Valley or any other entity. (See 
generally R. 3365-73; see also R. 3362 at ii 7 ("Except as expressly stated herein, this 
[Settlement] Agreement and a companion Contingent Fee Agreement, contain the entire 
agreement and understanding of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof.").) 
Accordingly, the district court appropriately held that "[t]he Settlement Agreement and 
Contingency Fee Agreement do not expressly assign the malpractice claim to [Cedar 
Valley]." (R. 2635.) 
Despite the above clear contract language, the district court went beyond and held 
that the City's "argument that it has not assigned the claim to [Cedar Valley is] 
inconsistent with the content of the [Contingent Fee] Agreement." (R. 2632.) In 
determining whether there is an implied assignment the district court properly recognized 
that '"the creation and existence of an assignment is to be determined according to the 
intention of the parties, which is to be discerned not only from the instruments executed 
by them, if an [sic], but from the surrounding circumstances."' (R. 2635 (quoting 6A 
C.J.S. Assignments § 57 (2010)).) The district court concluded that there was a partial, 
implied assignment because "the Agreements grant [Cedar Valley] and [sic] interest in 
both controlling the litigation and in the potential proceeds from the litigation." (R. 
2634.) These are merely conclusions that neither the agreements nor the undisputed facts 
and inferences support. In reaching these conclusions (really characterizations), the 
district court failed to properly analyze whether there was an implied assignment because 
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the district court did not consider the '"surrounding circumstances" of the agreements, 
including the undisputed facts submitted by the City. 
3. The district court unreasonably inferred conditions and facts 
disputed by the record evi<:f ence. 
The district court ignored the undisputed facts constituting the "surrounding 
circumstances" that determine whether in fact an implied assignment exists. (Compare R. 
3828-3833, R. 3950-58 with R. 2626-42.) It is undisputed the City brought its legal 
malpractice claim in its own name and on its own behalf. (R. 1-24; R. 3832 at~~ 18-21; 
R. 3951 at~~ 3-5; R. 3956-58 at~~ 12-19.) Perhaps most importantly, Cedar Valley had 
no control over the conduct of the litigation. (R. 3832 at ~~ 18-21; R. 3951 at~~ 3-5; R. 
3956-58 at ~~ 12-19.) As the City's own representative, Mr. Ifo Pili, testified by 
declaration, "the City never intended to transfer or assign the claim, or control over the 
claim to [Cedar Valley]." (R. 3831 at ~ 14.) Mr. Pili and the City's mayor, Mr. 
Christopher Pengra, further testified that they communicated directly with Snell & 
Wilmer about this case and they have never been involved with any communications 
(directly or indirectly) with any representative of Cedar Valley concerning the 
prosecution of the malpractice claim or strategy. (R. 3832 at~~ 18-21; R. 3951 at~ 4.) 
There is nothing in the record to rebut this. Thus, the district court's holding improperly 
interpreted the agreements without looking at the intent of the parties as borne out by 
their many months of conduct. And, as set forth in more detail below, each of the reasons 
underpinning the district court's decision is contrary to the law and the facts. 
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B. The Filing of the Lawsuit Was Not a Condition to Settlement. 
The district court incorrectly concluded that the City's filing of the instant lawsuit 
was a condition of its settlement with Cedar Valley. The district court's conclusion was 
based solely on a recital from the Contingent Fee Agreement. (R. 2633 (citing R. 3365).) 
The district court's conclusion is wrong in at least three ways. 
1. The recitals do not describe conditions. 
First, the district court misread the recital. The recital states that "[a]s part of the 
Settlement Agreement, City has agreed to make demand and if needed file and prosecute 
a complaint against PKH . . . alleging negligence and related malpractice claims 
("Lawsuit"), solely on the terms and conditions of this agreement." (R. 3365 at ~ C.) 
Nowhere in the recital does it state that the City's agreement to bring a lawsuit was a 
condition of settlement. If PKH refused the City's demands and settlement overtures, as it 
did, of course the City was interested in pursuing those claims. There is no record 
evidence that Cedar Valley made the City's prosecution of its claims a condition to 
settlement, and thus the district court erred to broaden the scope of the agreement by 
concluding that this suit was a "condition" of settlement. 
2. Recitals are not contract terms. 
Second, a recital is not binding. A recital is not a contractual term between the 
parties. See, e.g., Garrett v. Ellison, 72 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 1937) (holding that a portion 
of a promissory note that identified two individuals as payees was a mere recital and not a 
contractual term between the parties). Therefore, the district court further erred in 
construing the recital as a binding contractual term. 
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3. The facts directly contradict the district court's inferences. 
Third and finally, the district court's conclusion is contrary to the undisputed facts. 
The undisputed facts showed that the filing of the lawsuit was not a condition to 
settlement, and the City would have filed a lawsuit against PKH even if the City did not 
settle with Cedar Valley. Specifically, the city administrator's unrebutted, sworn 
declaration, stated "[i]f the City and [Cedar Valley] had not entered into an agreement to 
share proceeds as part of its settlement, [he] would have strongly recommended pursuing, 
and [he] believe[ d] the City would have pursued, the legal malpractice claim to recover 
whatever damages PKH's misrepresentations and poor legal advice had caused the City." 
(R. 3831-32 at if 17; see also R. 3957 at if 15.) 
The filing of the City's malpractice claim against PKH was not a condition of 
settlement at all. At most, the City used its pre-existing intent to sue PKH for malpractice 
to negotiate a more favorable settlement agreement with Cedar Valley and to obtain the 
benefit of litigation costs being advanced by a third party, much the same way a law firm 
might advance costs on behalf ofa contingent fee client. (R. 3830-31atifif12-14.) There 
is no evidence in the record that the City's decision to file a lawsuit gave Cedar Valley 
any control of the litigation. And the undisputed facts show, too, that after the agreements 
were signed Cedar Valley played no role whatsoever in making any decisions or strategy 
calls. Thus, it was error for the district court to infer from this vacuum that it did. 
C. Cedar Valley Did Not Choose the City's Attorney. 
The district court's decision also was based on its erroneous belief that Cedar 
Valley had a say in the selection of the City's counsel in this case. Again, the district 
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court's belief was improperly based on a recital in the Contingent Fee Agreement. (R. 
2633 (citing R. 3365).) Recitals are not part of the contractual agreement between the 
parties, and the recital relied on by the district court does not state or even imply that 
Cedar Valley selected Snell & Wilmer as counsel for the City. Rather, the recital states 
that the "City and Cedar Valley desire to retain [Snell & Wilmer] to bring the Lawsuit 
against PKH." (R. 3365.) The plain language of the recital states that both parties desire 
Snell & Wilmer to be counsel for the City, not that settlement or anything else was 
conditioned on Snell & Wilmer being counsel. 
Moreover, the undisputed testimony presented by the City in opposition to PKH's 
motion for summary judgment demonstrates that the City chose Snell & Wilmer as 
counsel, not Cedar Valley. Mr. lfo Pili, the City's administrator, testified that the "City 
agreed to using Snell & Wilmer because Snell & Wilmer was a logical choice to 
represent the City in the malpractice lawsuit. It was already acquainted with the 
complicated facts of the underlying case and the documents related thereto. Further, Snell 
attorneys had been instrumental in exposing PKH's misrepresentations .... As such, we 
believed Snell & Wilmer could litigate the case effectively and efficiently." (R. 3 831 at if 
15.) Similarly, Ms. Heather Jackson, the City's mayor during the Underlying Lawsuit 
and settlement, testified that "[She] was comfortable with the idea of the City's retaining 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. to bring the claims. . . . [and the City] believed Snell & Wilmer 
could litigate the case effectively and efficiently." (R. 3956-57 at if 13.) Neither PKH nor 
the district court pointed to any record evidence refuting the undisputed fact that the City, 
not Cedar Valley, selected Snell & Wilmer to be the City's counsel. Thus, the recital 
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relied upon by the district court-to the extent it had any effect at all-did not grant 
Cedar Valley any control of the litigation and thus cannot be considered an element in 
determining whether there was an implied assignment. 
D. Simultaneous Representation and Waiver of Confidentiality do 
not Equate to Surrender of Control. 
The district court further incorrectly reasoned that because the City and Cedar 
Valley were jointly represented by Snell & Wilmer and the City waived confidentiality, 
this was sufficient to give Cedar Valley some control over the litigation. But attorneys 
may jointly represent multiple clients, and frequently do so, albeit in the face of a 
waivable conflict. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1. 7. Parties may also choose to waive 
confidentiality in a lawsuit. See, e.g., Strohm v. ClearOne Comms., Inc., 2013 UT 21, if 
61, 308 P.3d 424 (recognizing the sharing of confidential information through a joint 
defense agreement). 
Here, Mr. Pili's undisputed testimony is that he had "not been involved with any 
conversation with any [Cedar Valley] representative concerning the prosecution of claims 
or strategies undertaken ... [and he is] not aware of any other City official having such a 
conversation. In all of [his] communications with [the City's] counsel on this matter, no 
one from [Cedar Valley] has directed any communications to [him] concerning the 
prosecution of claims or strategies undertaken." (R. 3832 at if 21; see also R. 3951 at if 4 
(Deel. of Mayor Christopher Pengra) ("I have been one of two primary points of contact 
for the City in comµmnicating with our attorneys, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P ., regarding the 
legal malpractice case against Parsons Kinghorn & Harris, P .C. . . . In all of my 
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communications with our counsel on this matter, no one from Cedar Valley . . . has 
directed any communications to me concerning the prosecution of claims or strategies 
undertaken.").) 
The City surrendered no control over the litigation by merely allowing Snell & 
Wilmer to continue its pre-existing attorney-client relationship with Cedar Valley. Joint 
representation and joint defense agreements are common practice in Utah. These 
agreements do not evidence an impermissible assignment. 
E. Cedar Valley Neither Has Settlement Authority Nor the Ability 
to Force the City to Accept or Reject a Settlement Offer. 
Finally, the district court erroneously held that the City effectively transferred 
control of the litigation to Cedar Valley by agreeing to obtain approval from Cedar 
Valley before accepting or rejecting a settlement offer. The Contingent Fee Agreement 
does not say this. It states in pertinent part, 
In the event PKH and/or its insurer(s) make an offer of settlement to [the 
City and/or Cedar Valley], and they cannot mutually agree on the terms of 
negotiated settlement of the Lawsuit, then the clients agree to first negotiate 
in good faith. Failing an agreement then, the parties shall mediate their 
dispute before a mediator ... In the event the dispute is not resolved by 
mediation, each of the [two parties] shall select an arbitrator and the two 
selected arbitrators shall select a third arbitrator . . . . The decision of the 
three arbitrators regarding whether to accept or reject the pending offer 
shall be binding on the clients. 
(R. at 3369 at ir 7.) 
First, the Court should take note of the fact that PKH has never made a settlement 
offer to the City that it was inclined to accept, and thus if PKH never makes an attractive 
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offer to the City, the clause is moot. No "rights" of Cedar Valley have been, and they 
may not ever be, triggered. 
Second, the language of the agreement does not support the district court's 
reading. Pursuant to the plain terms of the Contingent Fee Agreement, Cedar Valley 
cannot force the City to accept or reject a settlement offer. Rather, in the event that the 
City desires to accept a settlement offer from PKH, the Contingent Fee Agreement 
merely allows Cedar Valley to comment upon and mediate the reasonableness of the 
offer to determine whether such a settlement offer from PKH is "reasonable." Failing 
that, an independent neutral may need to become involved. This is no different from a 
standard contingency fee agreement between an attorney and her client. The district court 
ruled that the right to test the reasonableness of a settlement offer amounts to a surrender 
of control. That is not the law. 
F. The Policy Reasons for Not Allowing the Assignment of Legal 
Malpractice Claims Are Not Present Here. 
After considering the factors above and holding that the City partially assigned its 
legal malpractice claim against PKH to Cedar Valley by granting ''partial control" of the 
litigation to Cedar Valley, the district court next analyzed the policy reasons for not 
allowing the assignment of a legal malpractice claims. The district court identified the 
following public policy concerns: (1) avoiding the exploitation and merchandising of 
malpractice claims, (R. 2637-38 (citing Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 
389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)); (2) preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship, 
(R. 2638 (citing Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338 (Ind. 1991)); (3) preventing 
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collusion, (R. 2639 (citing Gurski v. Rosenblum and Filan, LLC, 885 A.2d 163 (Conn. 
2005), Kommavongsa v. Haskell, 67 P.3d 1068 (Wash. 2003)); (4) avoiding an abrupt 
and shameless shift of positions in the malpractice case, (R. 2639 (citing Picadilly, 582 
N.E.2d 338)); and (5) eliminating any distinction between assignment of a cause of action 
and an assignment of recovery, (R. 2639-40 (citing Town & Country Bank of Springfield 
v. Country Mut. Ins., Co., 121 Ill. App. 3d 216 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984), Gurski, 885 A.2d 
163)). After analyzing these public policy concerns, the district court "adopt[ed] the 
majority position that malpractice claims should not be assignable." (R. 2640.) Whether, 
and to what extent, these policies come into play is a highly fact sensitive inquiry. 
Because the City did not assign its legal malpractice claim, partially or otherwise, 
there is no need for this Court to determine whether Utah law prohibits the assignment of 
legal malpractice claims. Assuming, however, the agreements included some sort of 
transfer, and even if that transfer could be characterized as a "partial assignment," the 
undisputed facts of this case show that this case does not implicate the public policy 
issues with which courts are concerned. Thus, there was no assignment in violation of 
Utah's public policy and the district court's ruling should be reversed. 
1. The City did not exploit or merchandise its malpractice claim. 
The first public policy reason the district court identified was the risk of 
exploitation of legal malpractice claims. (R. 2637-38 (citing Goodley, 62 Cal. App. 3d 
3 89.) In Goodley, the California Court of Appeals held that legal malpractice claims are 
not assignable because "[t]he assignment of such claims could relegate the legal 
malpractice action to the market place and convert it to a commodity to be exploited and 
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transferred to economic bidders who have never had a professional relationship with the 
attorney." 62 Cal. App. 3d at 397. In Goodley, the party with the legal malpractice claim 
actually sold the claim to an assignee and the assignee brought the claim in his own 
name. Id. at 392. 
In contrast to Goodley, however, the Utah Supreme Court has already held that 
legal malpractice claims can be sold to total strangers to the relationship. Tanasse, 1999 
UT 49 at ,-i,-i 10-11. The idea of multiple bidders on a legal malpractice claim in a 
bankruptcy auction or in the execution sale on a judgment is not offensive to Utah public 
policy. See id. Notwithstanding that, the City did not sell or assign its malpractice claim. 
The City did not post its legal malpractice claim on eBay or otherwise put it up for bid in 
the market place. The City brought the malpractice claim in its own name, controlled the 
litigation, and stood to recover from any judgment against PKH. The City's actions did 
not rise to any exploitation of a legal malpractice claim. 
2. The sanctity of the attorney-client relationship is preserved. 
Next, the district court identified the public policy concern of the sanctity of the 
attorney-client relationship. (R. 2638 (citing Picadilly, 582 N.E.2d 338.) In Picadilly, the 
court held that "[t]he assignment of a legal malpractice claim is perhaps most 
incompatible with the attorney's duty of loyalty" because that duty can be weakened if 
zealous advocacy could be threatened by the knowledge that "a client can sell off a 
malpractice claim, particularly if an adversary can buy it." Picadilly, 582 N.E.2d at 342. 
Picadilly continued that "[i]f assignments were permitted, ... they would become an 
important bargaining chip in the negotiation of settlements .... An adversary might well 
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make a favorable settlement offer to a judgment-proof or financially strapped client in 
exchange for the assignment of that client's right to bring a malpractice claim against his 
attorney." Id. at 343. Again, this case does not implicate this policy. 
First, the Tanasse case shows that Utah's public policies are not offended if a 
stranger to the attorney-client relationship is the plaintiff suing the lawyer. In Utah, a 
lawyer representing a client whose financial circumstances could lead to bankruptcy or an 
adverse judgment always runs the risk a malpractice claim will go to bid. Moreover, this 
policy is not offended by the facts here because Cedar Valley did not purchase the claim 
from the City. In Picadilly, by contrast, the assignee purchased the claim in a bankruptcy 
proceeding (which Utah law allows), and although brought in the assignor's name, the 
assignor had no involvement in the malpractice suit. Id. at 339. Picadilly has no 
application here to suggest the City assigned its claim in any impermissible way. 
Second, Cedar Valley never made a settlement offer in exchange for an 
assignment of a legal malpractice claim. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the City 
paid Cedar Valley over $4.5 million to settle the Underlying Lawsuit. The Contingent 
Fee Agreement allowed the City to obtain the benefit oflegal services and the payment of 
costs by agreeing to share a portion of any recovery. As detailed above, this granted no 
control to Cedar Valley over the litigation. 
Third, the City was not judgment-proof or financially strapped, and thus was not 
susceptible to the sort of financial vulnerabilities that concern other courts. And again, 
being financially vulnerable, as in bankruptcy, is not a bar to a malpractice claim being 
transferred to a third party willing to pay value for it. Tanasse, 1999 UT 49 at iii! 10-11. 
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Finally, it is undisputed the City was inclined to bring these claims to seek 
compensation for the multimillion dollar exposure to which PKH's negligence subjected 
it. Neither the Settlement Agreement nor the Contingent Fee Agreement did any violence 
to the attorney-client relationship between the City and PKH, which relationship 
continues today. 
3. The City and Cedar Valley did not collude. 
The district court next identified the public policy concern of protecting against 
collusion. (R. 2639 (citing Gurski, 885 A.2d 163; Kommavongsa, 67 P.3d 1068).) In 
Gurski and Kommavongsa, the courts held that permitting assignments creates an 
opportunity for a party to stipulate to damages in exchange for an agreement from the 
other party not to execute on the judgment and instead to take an assignment of a legal 
malpractice claim. 885 A.2d at 174; 67 P.3d at 1078. Those courts rightly observed that 
when a party stipulates to damages, or to a judgment, but faces no risk of collection, the 
damages are not real. It is merely a number that the parties generated through collusion. 
Of course nothing like that happened here. 
The City did not stipulate to judgment. Cedar Valley did not agree to forebear 
collection on a judgment in exchange for an assignment of a legal malpractice claim. 
Rather, to avoid claims exceeding $8.8 million, the City agreed to pay Cedar Valley over 
$4.5 million in cash money, to the prejudice of its citizens. (R. 3384 at Resp. to ~ 5.) 
This was not a hollow judgment. It was a real and very substantial loss occasioned by 
PKH' s negligence and misrepresentations to its client. There was no collusion. 
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4. Any shift of positions in this case is present in any 
malpractice case. 
The district court next considered the "role reversal" that inevitably occurs in legal 
malpractice claims. (R. 2639 (citing Picadilly, 582 N.E.2d 338).) In Picadilly, the court 
described the nature of a legal malpractice claim, which requires a party to show that (i) 
they employed the attorney, (ii) the attorney failed to exercise ordinary skill and 
knowledge, (iii) proximate cause, and (iv) loss to the party/plaintiff. 582 N.E.2d at 344. 
"To prove causation and the extent of the harm, the client must show that the outcome of 
the underlying litigation would have been more favorable but for the attorneys' 
negligence. This proof typically requires a 'trial within a trial.'" Id. The Picadilly court 
then explained that "[b ]ecause of the unique nature of the trial within a trial ... the jurors 
hearing the evidence ... would rightly leave the courtroom with less regard for the law 
and the legal profession than they had when they entered." Id. at 345. That rationale is, 
however, an indictment of every legal malpractice case, of any kind. And, to the extent a 
legal malpractice claim purchased out of a bankruptcy or from a judgment debtor through 
execution involves a shift in legal position, Utah public policy is not concerned with it. 
Tanasse, 1999 UT 49 at~~ 10-11. 
Neither the district court nor the court in Picadilly explain or analyze why the 
assignment of a legal malpractice claim would increase a juror's disregard for the law or 
lawyers any more than a non-assigned legal malpractice case. And in fact, the Picadilly 
court explained that "[s]hifts in position are inevitable as long as clients are allowed to 
bring malpractice claims, and attorneys are permitted to fight them." 582 N.E.2d at 345, 
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n.10. Here, there is nothing untoward about the City's believing PKH's advice for years 
and then suddenly realizing that advice was negligent and wrong when put under the 
scrutiny of the Underlying Lawsuit. 
Thus, this public policy concern exists in any legal malpractice case. It does 
nothing to determine whether a claim is assignable, nor whether here an actual 
assignment, partial or otherwise, occurred. 
5. The City and Cedar Valley did not attempt to bypass public 
policy concerns. 
Finally, the district court analyzed the "meaningless distinction" between an 
assignment of a cause of action and an assignment of recovery from such an action in 
order to circumvent the public policy concerns. (R. 2639-40 (citing Town & Country 
Bank of Springfield, 121 Ill. App. 3d 216; Gurski, 885 A.2d 163).) Here, as the district 
court correctly recognized "[t]he Settlement Agreement and Contingency Fee Agreement 
do not expressly assign the malpractice claim to [Cedar Valley]." (R. 2635.) Yet without 
any further factual basis the district court held that the agreement between the City and 
Cedar Valley to share in the proceeds of any recovery from the legal malpractice action 
was an attempt to bypass the other public policy concerns. That was error as a matter of 
law. The City settled the Underlying Lawsuit with Cedar Valley. In doing so, the City did 
not assign or give up control of its legal malpractice claim. The City obtained the benefit 
of having its litigation costs paid, and it obtained the benefit of legal counsel whose 
familiarity with the facts of the case made it the natural choice. In exchange, the City 
agreed to share proceeds from a recovery, which is standard in any contingency fee 
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agreement. The district court's ruling effectively calls into question the validity of every 
contingency fee agreement. 
The district court erred in going beyond the agreement, ignoring undisputed facts, 
and finding a partial, implied assignment here. Thus this Court should reverse the district 
court and remand for trial. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN PLACING CONDITIONS ON 
THE CITY'S CHOICE OF COUNSEL. 
If this Court concludes that the district court erred in concluding that the City did 
not assign its legal malpractice claim against PKH to Cedar Valley, then Snell & Wilmer 
is certainly permitted to represent the City in this case. If, however, the Court elects to 
reach this issue, the Court should nevertheless reverse the district court and allow the 
City to use the counsel it chose to represent it in this lawsuit. 
A. The District Court Ignored the City's Right to the Counsel of Its 
Choice. 
It is well-settled that a trial court "must recognize a presumption in favor of [the 
party's] counsel of choice." Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988). This 
"presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict but by a 
showing of a serious potential for conflict." Id. Here, the district court neither 
acknowledged the presumption in favor of the City's right to the counsel of its choice nor 
found an actual or potential conflict. Thus, even assuming Cedar Valley had control of 
the litigation (it did not) and the City's malpractice claim was assigned to Cedar Valley 
(it was not), the district court's decision to essentially disqualify any firm that merely has 
a vague "association" with Cedar Valley was error. 
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B. Placing Conditions on the City's Counsel Was Unsupported. 
In the final sentences of its Ruling, and with no analysis, the district court held that 
the City "is permitted to pursue its claim against PKH ... [if it] is not represented by 
attorneys associated with [Cedar Valley]." (R. 2641.) Importantly, the district court did 
not say that Snell & Wilmer, by name, was barred from representing the City. By 
implication, if for example the association between Snell & Wilmer and Cedar Valley 
were terminated, Snell & Wilmer would still be entitled to represent the City in pursuing 
the claims to trial. Unfortµnately, the district court provided neither reasoning nor 
analysis for its decision on attorneys. Thus it is difficult, if not impossible, for the City or 
this Court to know the grounds for this decision. Regardless, the district court's sua 
sponte holding depriving the City of the counsel of its choice violates the City's rights for 
at least two reasons. 
C. PKH Did Not Move to Disqualify Counsel. 
The district court erred because this question was never properly before it. In fact, 
in spite of the fact that PKH was aware of Snell & Wilmer's representation months 
before this case was filed, and in spite of going through expensive discovery and 
negotiations for months with Snell & Wilmer, PKH never filed a motion to disqualify 
Snell & Wilmer. No one suggested, and no one briefed, the existence of an alleged 
conflict or other reason why Snell & Wilmer could not adequately or ethically represent 
the City. Instead, the very last sentence of PKH's argument in support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment stated, without explanation or citation to controlling or persuasive 
authority, that "[i]f this court dismisses the case without prejudice and [the City] chooses 
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to re-file, [the City] cannot be controlled in any way in that litigation by [Cedar Valley] 
and cannot be represented by [Snell & Wilmer]." (R. 3107.) The district court erred 
when it embraced this back door and naked effort to prejudice the City's ability to 
prosecute its claims. 
D. The Sole Authority for Disqualifying Counsel Has No 
Resemblance to this Case. 
Even if the matter were properly before the district court, the district court erred in 
concluding that a firm '"associated" with Cedar Valley could not represent the City. PKH 
cited to only a single case, without any analysis, in support of its argument that Snell & 
Wilmer could not represent the City. (R. 3106-07 (citing Edens Tech., LLC v. Kile 
Goekjian Reed & McManus, PLLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D.D.C. 2009).) Edens is easily 
distinguishable and does not support the district court's ruling here. 
In Edens, a technology company sued its former attorneys for legal malpractice 
stemming from the former attorneys' representation of the company against a competitor 
in a patent infringement case. 675 F. Supp. 2d at 76. The defendant attorneys moved to 
dismiss, alleging in part that the company had improperly assigned the legal malpractice 
claim to its competitor. Id. The malpractice lawsuit arose from a settlement agreement 
entered into between the company and its competitor in the underlying lawsuit. Id. 
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the company consented to judgment in the 
underlying lawsuit and the competitor agreed not to collect on the consent judgment in 
exchange for "a partial assignment of the proceeds" from the company's legal 
malpractice action against its former attorneys, which the competitor agreed would be 
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considered satisfaction in full of the amount of the consent judgment. Id. at 77. The 
settlement agreement allowed the company to keep any amounts it recovered in excess of 
the consent judgment. Id. 
Most importantly, the settlement agreement in Edens wrested from the plaintiff its 
choice of counsel, and made that choice subject to the whims of the assignee of the claim. 
"The malpractice action against [the former attorneys], although filed with [the company] 
named as the plaintiff, is to be prosecuted by counsel selected by [the competitor], and 
[the company] must cooperate in the suit." Id. (emphasis added.) Finally, the settlement 
agreement provided that "all decisions relating to this malpractice action are 'controlled' 
by [the competitor], with [the competitor] paying all litigation costs and attorneys' fees." 
Id. (emphasis added.) Accordingly, pursuant to the terms ,of the settlement agreement, 
the competitor selected the attorneys who would represent the company in the 
malpractice claim. Id. at 78. The court held that the company improperly assigned its 
malpractice claim because it essentially gave up all control of the claim in the settlement 
agreement. Id. at 86. The court then dismissed the complaint without prejudice allowing 
the company to refile its complaint if ( 1) the competitor had no control over the 
malpractice claim and (2) the company was not "represented by attorneys associated with 
[the competitor]." Id. 
E. The City's Case Contrasts to Edens. 
The district court apparently embraced the policy reasons and rationale of the 
Edens decision, but without any facts resembling those in that case. Here, as opposed to 
Edens, the Settlement Agreement required the City to pay a total settlement amount of 
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$4,560,000 to Cedar Valley, regardless of the outcome of this malpractice action. (R. 
3051-52.) Additionally, the City (not Cedar Valley) chose Snell & Wilmer to represent 
the City. (R. 3365, 3831 at ii 15, 3956-57 at ii 13.) The undisputed facts showed that the 
City carefully selected Snell & Wilmer as counsel because "it was already well 
acquainted with the complicated factual history of the events giving rise to the claims, 
and the documents related thereto .... As such, [the City] believed Snell & Wilmer could 
litigate the case effectively and efficiently." (R. 3956-57 at i!l3.) The facts also showed 
that-consistent with the terms of the Contingent Fee Agreement and the Settlement 
Agreement-the City controlled the litigation, interacted directly with Snell & Wilmer 
throughout the course of the legal malpractice case, and never communicated with 
anyone from Cedar Valley concerning the prosecution of the City's claims or strategy. 
(R. 3832 at iii! 20-21, 3951 at ii 4, 3957 at ii 17.) 
Without any analysis or even allowing proper briefing, the district court ordered 
that the City could pursue its claim if it could demonstrate that its counsel was not 
associated with Cedar Valley in any way. This robbed the City of its choice of counsel, 
and effectively disqualified Snell & Wilmer from representing its client merely by 
"association" with another firm client. The law does not support this violation of an 
essential right to counsel of one's choosing. 
F. PKH Seeks a Strategic, Not an Ethical, Advantage. 
Finally, PKH's self-serving motive in trying to deprive the City of Snell & 
Wilmer's help is apparent. Since 2009, when Snell & Wilmer first began examining the 
City's conduct under the Capacity Purchase Agreement in light of the advice it was 
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receiving from PKH, it has developed a familiarity with the facts and issues in this case 
that could not be duplicated without a very significant financial and time commitment. 
No evidence is necessary to show the City will be greatly prejudiced and harmed if it is 
not permitted to proceed with Snell & Wilmer as its counsel. ':fhis case has been pending 
since 2013. The parties have conducted extensive and very expensive discovery. If the 
City is forced to select new attorneys, these new attorneys would not only need to get up 
to speed on the issues surrounding this case, but on a decade plus of history in the 
Underlying Lawsuit as well. Under these circumstances, it is unjust and unfairly 
prejudicial to force the City to retain new counsel. 
Because the trial court, without explanation or analysis, abused what little 
discretion it had to tell the City it may no longer have the six years of history and 
experience Snell & Wilmer has in this case, this Court should reverse the district court's 
holding and permit the City to move forward with its legal malpractice claims against 
PKH with Snell & Wilmer as counsel, whether or not Snell & Wilmer is "associated" 
with Cedar Valley. And finally, if that association causes any concern, this Court should 
clarify that Snell & Wilmer may continue to represent the City if its former association 
with Cedar Valley is concluded. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth herein, the City respectfully requests that the Court 
reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand to the district court for 
proceeding with expert discovery and a trial on the merits. The City further requests that 
the Court reverse the district court's decision depriving the City of its choice of counsel, 
37 
including clarification that if Snell & Wilmer no longer represents Cedar Valley, it is not 
"associated" with Cedar Valley for purposes of the district court's Ruling. 
DATED this 18th day of May, 2016. 
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Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
J/L· 
Mark 0. Morris 
Amber M. Mettler 
Douglas P. Farr 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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SE1TLEl\1 ENT AG REETVIENT 
Cedar V11Ucy \Vat(~r Company, LLC, a Florida lirnitcd liability corripany, (';CV"), 
and Eagle Mounhlin City. a municipality and pol ilkal subdivision of tbe Sta tu of Utah 
('Tity"), h1:rcby enter into tbis Sl;t!lement Agreemcni (the "Agreement'') as of the 5th day of 
February, 2013 ("EffeL~tive Dntt~"), !'or the puq'.JOse of sellling and resolvi11g ccnnin claims, 
con1roversics and disputes between them nn the terms nllCI conditions :ind for the 
considerntion i;ct forth below. 
l. !n.lQJJl.of ..t\l~_J'!!JJ)es. TLwrt) is a di;;pute between the parties to this Agreement 
arising from .the performance, administrntion and paym~nt trncle,r a Cl)ntracl between then1 
dated February l5, 2000 that is commonly rcforted to as tli(~ "2000 Water Capitcity 
Agtet~mcnt.' 1 The di;.;pute resulted in the filing of tha.t certain legal action now pending in the 
Fourlh JucJicinl l'listrict Oiurt for Utah County, State of Ut~i.11, captioned Cei;Ji!L.Yall.Qy.,Y.Y'.:t1ter 
J:;_q.:,~Y:.,_Eagle M;_Q,tJnlaiu_(;itv~, C~1:w No. OcJD402122 (lhe "Litigation"). Without \vaiving or 
c.:nnceclinf.>lhdr respective. positions in the Litigation. it is Lht: intent and purpose of the 
parties to.this Agreen:1cJ1t to fully and completely settle, compromise and resolve all. c.lalms 
amh::ontrovt~rsies lmtwecn them arising out of or in any way referring or relating: to the. 
Litigation ;rnd Un: 2000 Water Cap<1city Agn:emcnl up io the dtitG of this Agreement. Upon 
execurioD of this Agrecrr1orll, the obligations ol' the City under the 2000 Water Capacity 
Agreement shall be dcemi.;d fuifillcd. 
2. DJB,J1J..L%11liILl~iligii_tji'.)J1 The parties hereby agree that t>uhsequcn1 to ihc 
approval of this Agrnement by the City Council of Eagle Mountain City pursuant to a 
nieeting duly not:icNL n Stipu.lation, l\ilotinn :ind Order of Di~misfl:'il shall he execl!ted by tht: 
respective counsel for CV and Uw City and filed in the Fourlh Judidal District Courl 
disn1issing 1lw Litigation wilb prejndiec and upon the merits, with all pa.rties to bear tbcir 
own coiit:> ancl attorney's tees. 
3. I:.&Xilli<.!ll.QJ: Gil:}~. As considenition for di8inis)><il of the Litigation and as part 
of this f,grce.mcni, City slu\ll p:-1y jointly 1·0 CV ;rnd its COlil1Sel, Snell & Wilmer it1 t:urrc:nt 
U.S. funds; tbe su111 ot'Twt11'vliHion EighL!·lundl'ed Thousand Dollins ($2,800,000.00), 
without a<:;crn ing intc.l'est, pa:yment to be made. tin Lhc folfowing schedule; a) Two Million 
D0Jh1rs within~;·~ l'>ut-:lnt~ $s days of the approva l of ll1i:· /\gre~menl by the Engle 
Mouim~in City ·Cou:ncil; b) .Five-Hundred Thous.and Do ll am ($500,000.00) 011 or before 
.March l, 2014; and cl the balance of Thret~ Hunc!r~~d Thousrrnd dollars ($~VKl,000.00) Qn or 
b£·.'Corc Fchru;ny 5, 20i.5. 
4. 6 1;!(~iJi91ElU~~(rn_sidt'.faU.!W· Jn "ddition to Lhc mom~tary p11ymen1.s described 
above, bq~i1111 ing r_l1~. the ~1:cond an.11; ·~r .'>::g.y of the EHccl i ve:. D:1 te, the Ci~y s~1'.tl! _pay to CV 







Prindpal''), wi.thout accruing interest, as (nllnws: 
a. The sum nf' Seve11 HwJdrtd Twerny Dolhrrs ($720.00) nmttiplicd by the 
number of reside11tH1I building permits bitted anywlrnrc in the City after February 5, 20J 5 imtil !he 
$.L76M Pdncipal is paid in full The City ~hall make these paymc11Lc; lo CV on a quarterly basis, 
beginnfog on April l, 2015, and sh1ill simultnneou:Hy provide CV i111 accoun(ing of building 
permits iss11ccl duri og the quarter just ended. 
b. At any time prior to the Cltis $1. 76M Principal obligation being satisfied, 
CV shall fo1ve· the rjgh1 in the following liinite.d circunist1rnces· to ut ifizc ··n crcdit·to be applied by 
the City nguinst payrnents owing towards the $1.76M Jhindpal. Upo11 receiving a writing from 
CV rngue:.'1ing a credit against Building Department Plan Review Fees. nnd all Submiual, 
Application, Procc~sing, Review and Recording Fees as identified in fhc City Omsolidntcd Pee 
Schedule being City Resolution Nn. R-J 8-2012, which fees and monies the City would otherwise 
h;we 1bc righl to coiled from ihlr'J part.ic,., seeking npprovaJ;; frofi:t lhc City, the City shall credit 
•igainst the$ L 76lVI Principal the nmouut of any such fees and monies. These credits, if any, slnill 
have Jlll effect on llK\ City'$ obi igations to make quarter! y payments to CV beginning two (2) ycms 
after the Eifective Date, olher tlnm to reduce the total number of such payme1lls by reason of 
rech.1ctions ii1 tlic total $:t .76M. Principal. The City shall provide to CV written accountings o:f these 
credits on a qunrti;rly basfs, eve.rt if there <lre 110 such credits to report. By way of example only. ff 
CVte.qL1estcd hi ,.,,:rili.ug a credit in May, 2013 of $500 towards a City pfan check fee tha! t.hc City 
\von·ld otherwise charge In connection with a new building permit., such credit 'NO\Jkl hnve no 
impaci on the City's ohligntion to make thdirsl pi1ymcnts tow'ards t11e $J. 76M Princip<il after the, 
Effoctivc Dntc, rior on the. i.unou111 of such inith1l payments, but rnthcr the $1. 76M Princ:ip<1I. amoun( 
wonl(J be rnd11ccd by the ·$500;00 crndit-aJ.crng Wi.th the llUtflber of srich payments made to CV by 
the City; Thi.-: crqdit nwchanism ctmnot be used to avoid paymi;rnt Qf in1pact fees. 
c. The .pmties acknowledge thnr the City's payments hereunder arc for 
con1plc1ion of the p:-tyments owed by City to CV for fht·. assets acquired by City from CV afi set 
forth and described in the 2000 Water Capacity Agrcemcn!, including wiihout .limitation, well, 
wa(er capacity, wel1 casing, wen p11mps, pipelines, water tanks, real propNty~ easements, ri.ghts of 
way, nml r(,]alL;d in:!'rwnruciurc ;111<.l i1.nprovemi:~n1s. 
5. .t-'.htJ.~w1..Q.en~r..ol.I~0.!.t?.B'.if ...Q.Lt\.UJ~1<1i!!b'i· As part nf this Agreement, CV and the 
City, for and mi behalf of thernsdV(;S and thc:ir respective employees, ag~)nls, rcprcsenlaLives. 
inckmnitors, insl1re.rs, successors, and assigns, h.creby release and forever di1;char.ge one another, 
together with their l'.:mpJoyces, agellts, reprcsentnlives, inclemnitors, insurers, sucl--essors, and 
ttssigns, From any tmd all Cfai'ms. demands, liahilhies, damages, causes of action, cxi:.;ts a.nd 
expenses, including attorney'~ roes, ar.ising out oi' or iu any way related to the Litigation und the 
subject nu\Ht~r of thi~ Agreement. Expressly excluded from thfa Release are m1y and all claims the 
City may have againsl its own <11.tonrnys. <ls s.et forth in the Contingent Fee Agrcl:>1neut idenliJ'lc:d in 
pnragrapb 7 hereof The- foregoing rclcn~~c spcdfically excludes release from the terms and 










;irising out of or related to tile t~nforcemem ol the icnns (rf this Agrccmelll, the prc\:<dling 
party shall be entitled to recover its fC:asonahlc GOS ts and attorney's foes, inclnding 
1~cc-.ountfog expe1ises. 
7. 10.t~.:filatloh, Except as expressly stated herein, th.is Agreement tind il 
compnt.iio.n Contingent Fee AgreemeJ1t, c::ontain the eutire agreement aml understanding of the 
pat'l'ies wHh tespecl to the subject maher hernof, and ,integrates aU prior conversations, 
.discussiol\S o.r tmdcrtakings ·Of whatever kind or Mture and may only be modifo~CJ by a 
Sltbsequcflt writing duly cxcc.utcd. by the p<trti.es her.eto. 
8. f,cronteqrnrts"" This document rrrny be executed in one or rnorc .com:ite:rpart11, 
whrth iogetl1er s'hal.l com:;titute one and the same docun1011t. 
9. 81m:JJ_\11nt.Dl~ This Agrecrnenl may no1 be modified except by nn instrtnnent in 
writing signed by the panics hereto. 
lO. l\(ls.Jjj.lQ11al Ac.lli,. The parties :"hall do &U\~·h 1\lrtht~r acts and things nnd shiiU 
ex0ecnte and dcliV(lf such additional dncnm1~11ts and instru.rncnts 11s 1rn1y he rci1i>Onably 
riGC:e.ssary -or rcasonaibly" requested b;1 a party or it;; counsel to obtain approvals or other 
benefits de~cribed in this Agrnemen t. 
12,. b,utJirr.rlzJi.tfru.h Each individual executing thi." Agreement do~.~ thereby 
repte&enrm1d w11rranl to the other signers that the indlviclual has been duly auihorized t() 
execute and deliver t11is Agreement in the capacity ami for the pHrty specified. 
13-. JVIU.tM~lEi.tt.ti9;,llli1iOQ.jn P...Q.£1!!.Jn:.nt Pr!{IDUfil)QlJ.,. Each party has· pntticipntcd 
iriiltei'ia!Jy Jn the negorialion and preprm1tion of this Agree.me.itt and any rehlled items; in the 
event a dispute concern.irtg thi~ interpi-etatinn fff any pwvision of this A.gn:emerit 6r any relatGd 
item, the rule of construction to the effo()t that certain arnbiguities arc to be consirued against 
the party drafting a clocumcl\l will not ap1'lly, 
1_4. .NJ.UJ1.frQ.~P<..\I.LYJ1Qtt.',~_t!f.IJm:J_!lt£f.!:!):;i_L'i ... Except iis express!)' prt:ividcd herein, 
n.ntliing i;ontfiiirnd in this Agr.etmrnn! is intended to bendiL iillY pe.rson or entity other tlurn the 
partfo8 to this Agreement; and no n~prcsentation or wan:anty is intended for the ht\ne:fit of, or 
lo be relied upon by, a:ny person or entity whkh is not n patty to this Agrcemei1t. 
15 Nn Waiver~ Om:: or nwre 'vaivcrs ·M the breach of nny covenant, term or 
condition hereof by eithe.r purly shall not be construed a.<: a waiver of a subsequent breach of 
the, .~i1me nr of arty either covemrnt, term ()r c.:ondition . 
.16. U ..iR~Uikcr..Ht'!'..tt.0.,. This l\grccrnenl shall inun~- to lhc benefit lif, nml be binding 
upQn, the parties hereto and r.hoir rns·pective heirs, representatives, ol'ficl~r:>, ugcnts, 
employees , members, successors and assigns. 
.... 









WHEREFORE, the pnrties have i.'.Xecuted the! foregQb1g to be effective as of tbe 
Effc.ctive Date. 
''CV'' 
Cedar VatJey Water Company, LLC 
/..-----1 I /.,.. . / 
Cr :iJ,~Jember 
STATE OF UT AH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF LJTAH 
. ilC" ~ · On this J? day of -~ · , 2013, before me personally appeared 
John w·aldcn, knmvn to me l t.l 'e tlrc~lO executed lh.e S.eulement Agrcem~nt herein 
in behalf of CV and ncknowledged to me that hG excmncd Lhe same. for the purposes therein 
stated. 
~~~ 
Notary Publi~ ' 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY 
By _____ __ _ 
Heather fackson, lts :tvfayor 
Attest: 











CONTING!".i'f!' l<'EE ACmlmMENT 
THJS AGREEMENT ("A~ireernent") is entered into effcctjve !IS of Febnrnry 5, 2013 
wnong falgle Mum1tain City ("Clti'); Cetiur Villley Water Company, LLC ("Cedar Valll!y'') 
nnd Snell & Wilme1· t..L.P. ("Attorney"). City nnrl Cedar Vl\lley are sometimes referred lo he1·ein 
colleclivcly a~ "Clients." 
A. In lh~ OUlHSt: of defendi ng r,g;frnst ch1iLtm l>nl\lghl ngninst the City by Codnr 
Valley for, uniong other things hreuch of co11lract, Clly 11tUi lleen n<lvi;ed <tncl tocltly undcrsl<mds 
rhnt it may hnvc claims !'or legi1I mnlprni;licc ag<1inst the law :fi rm of P•Hsoml Kinghorn Hnrris, u 
Utah profossionnl ~orporntitrn ('"PKH"), arising from PK.H's 11dvicc to City rcgardJng nn 
agr~ tlmen L cntilled "2.000 Town Walden ~~'el l ti ! Cnp11cily Purchase Agreement" (the "2000 
r~grccmout"), entered intl1 hctWC•}ll Cedllr Vn)l.,:y il,nd City on or 11bout the 15 111 d\1y ot'Fcbrunry, 
2000. Muny of the factii 1111d le-gal theories c:i me 10 the City's Httclltion lhrougil tmmy months of 
effort:~ by Atlorney lo dt}mons!rnlc: \hut the City's 11cls und omissions on the u<lvicc of PKH were 
in faci bre.aches of the 2000 Agreement, exposing City lo Cedar Vullcy's dainis for dnnrnges, 
interest, and attorneys' foci: in excess of $8 million. T11ese facts and legal theories are also the 
product of Cedar Valley's cxpencl'ing rnonie~ ont of pocket for costs towi1rcfa the litigation. 
B. To resolw. the above litigation, Cil/ and Cedn1· Valley hnve entered into that 
c~rtniu Settlcmellt Agn::enm1t, di1tcd effective February 5, 2o:t 3, rel\olving all claims between 
lhcm arising from th<:. 2000 Agreement in tlw action, Cedar Vnlley Water Company, LLC v. 
Eagle f\l.lmmtain City, Civ. No. 09042122, fomth fodicittl Di8triet Court ("Settlement 
Agreement"). 
C. As p11rt of the Seltlc11rnnt f\gn:e.1 rn:nt, City hiw agreed lo rnakr: ckmnnll nnd if 
11t:1':r!t1d Cilc· antl prnsec11it n complaint ll,~i!im;t PKH in the Third .hiclicia.1 District Cmll't, Salt Lnke 
County, ~>tnte of U!.~~h. fLU::ging 1rn~~igel!rn and related malprnctice duims ("Ll!l\lSUit"), wlcly on 
lbc f.erms :md em:dititm1; of this Agr~·t:me:d. 
D. Cit'y t1nd Ccd11J Valley· dt1sirc :o r~t1dn Attnrl'Jcy w !Jl·h:ig thr;;. l.nwsuil ngllill:lf. P.KH, 
in p<irt, bc:.~m;r;n t\Horney ha~ (JJ:tcnsive cxpl!dcnc:e witl1 :,ucl k1;owlcdg.e of the fiu.:ts nnd has 
developed c:vitkuce 1:111p1 •orling ihc Clly's •:lnim~; agai11!it PKH ln the Ll1ws11it. 
E. In J:he Selllement Agrnt·.nwm. City anr.I Cednr Valky <1gre1~cl that aftl!I' paymeut of 
cos I.~;, ead1 woulti n::ccive 0~1e-lhitd, omt Atlurncv woulcl rccdve <;S its fee for legal ~ervice.~ onll-
lldrcl, o.f tl11:i rncov<:ry, if any, from .PKH in ihe Li1wsu.it. To that end, the pm tic.~ arc entering into 
tlti:l /\grcc1m;nt. 
r. C.licons and Attorney now desire to enter into lh.is Agrcc.rm:nt in accnrdnnce with 
the wrms Hel forlh herein, 










. CONF/D[NTJAL -1 
l. Fee Pnyme11..t. Except 11s prol'idr~d hy Section 2 bt\1ow, if the Lnwsuit is resolved 
by woy of an agrr.:ecl seltlcment, in consiclurn1i0n ol' the services lo be rendered l>y Attorney Jn 
comrnction wilh the Lawsuit, Clients euch 11grel:J that Allorney is entitled lo one-third (l/3) of Lhe 
sumi; recovered fiom PKH (including its inwn'1'r;), ufter 011l of pocket costs nre first clcductcd 
from such recovery. In the event that the Luw::;uil is tried aud the court uwt1rds domages, mid if 
Cily obt:iins an nwurd of 111tonwy foe11 und O>sis (d;;fined below) from the court {"Award''), the 
Award shall not he added lo the damages portion of the Judgment for purposes of calculating the 
one-third conti.ngcncy fee owed to Attorney. Ccd~r V11lley mid City shnll receive from lhe 
Award all :;urns t11locatcd to Costs as ruimburscmcnt for their res[Jective obligntions n.nd 
payments towards Co~ls. 
-2. ~1mr.:ll. In the event of an appeal in connection with the Lawsuit, Attorney RlH1ll 
have the option to (i) represent City in appeal or (ii) withdrnw from representation of City, us 
follows: 
a. Jf Attorney represents City :rnd City prcvnils on appeal or po~t-trial 
moticm, o.r if the case settles or is in. any way otheiwise resolved during the pendet1cy of the 
appeal, Clicnls shnJJ pay AtLorney forty pcrcenl (40%) of the tot11l sum recovered, if any, by 
reason thereof, lr.aving their reRpective rccoveq to be 30% each. 
b. Attorney may withdraw, imd if Attorney does not represent City and City 
prevails on nppeal or posHrittl motion, or if (he case settles or is in ~ny way otherwise resolved 
during !he pcudency of the appenl, Cl-ientli Rhnll pny Attorney 011e-thkd (.1/3) of the tot:1l sum 
recovered, if any, by reason there.of. 
3. ,Cost11. As usc.:cl herein, the ti;:rm "Costs" rnc.nns s1.m1s expended for subpoenas, 
photos. photuc.:opics, scnnning, facsimiles, telephone lolls, cxhibils used nt hc<irings, depo!:illo11s, 
emir! repQL'ter costs, reporlll, wiLMss statement~. expert wltnt:t .. ~cs, nncl all other out-ol'-pockct 
1:xpem;es directly incu1•red jn investignllng m Jltiguting the. Lnwsu!t. Co.<;ts shull 11 !~0 include the 
out of rocket CJ-;pens1~S l'hnl Cedor Vnllcy an.d Ci ty incurred in connection with th\l prosccu!lon or 
the ch1i711s on the 200() Agreement, wh it:h <1llll)Uars 1he pii nies ugrce shall be reimbursed from the 
first proceeds of nny recovery on the Lawsuit. 
a. Cedar Valley and City hereby agree lhal in addition lo the payment of fees 
ro Att-orncy required under Section 1 l\nd Section 2 above, and regardless of whether any 
amounts are recovered on City's bclrnlf or the outcome of any lawsuit, ull Costs incurred in 
connection with the Lawsuit. shall be paid by Ccdur Vullcy, but all amount of such Cost.q shall be 
fin;t rr;puill from uny recovery received. To th;\l end, Cedar Valley shall pay Co~rs in 11dvtmce 
when requested by Allorney or required by any experts, consultnnts or vendors. 
b. SHOULD CITY'S CASE NOT RESULT lN A RECOVERY, EITHER 
BY SETTLEMENT, TRlAL, APPEAL, ARBITRATION OR OTHERWISE, CLIENTS SHALL 
OWE ATTORNEY ABSOLUTELY NOTHING FOR ITS TlME AND LEGAL SERVICES; 
HOWEYEH, CEDAH YALLEYACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT rs REQUIRED TO 
REIMBURSE ATTORNEY'S OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS INCURRED IN CONNEC.'TION 
WITH THE LAWSUIT, REGARDLESS OFT[-!E OUTCOME OF THE LAWSUIT. 
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I CONFIDENTIAL 
•k 'l'epilJlW.tLQ.n. A.ltmno)' 1m1y 1e11ninu(Cl/caricel this Agrecmenl if lhe Clienls ure In 
breuch of their obJig11tio11s umlcr lhi:> Ai,tn .. ~mo1 1!. or t\llorm~y ' s lnvcslig111ion disclo~es that 
i:erta in claims do not <1ppe~r to lrnvc merit :ir are not cconomicully µrncl:icn l to pW'suc, ~lr i( the 
Al!o rnc~ i~ otJ~crwi!ie rcqllired 1.0 do S(l , i11 l1CCCH1l11uce with the rules of rrofcssi·onnl i:on<luGL 
governing nllorncys. The rclntionship estuulis]lcd by this Agreemen t is s11L>ject lo lerrninolion as 
foll ,rm: · 
a. Attorney rcsr.rves the right to withdraw from this mnlter i.f the Clients foil 
tu honor this Ag1·eemenl or for any just re11son as permitted or required under the Utah .RulcB of 
Professional Conduct 01· as permitted by the Rules of the Co11rtc; of the State of Utah. 
Notification of wilhtlntwaJ s.h!llJ be mudc in writing to the Client~. In the event of such 
wilhdrawnl, 1he ClionL'i 11gree 1·0 promptly pay !he At.tomey for all Costs and obligations incurred 
purniwnt to this Agreement priol' lo the date or such wilhdrnwul. Such withdrawal shall have no 
effect upon Clients' payment obligations under subsections 1 and 2 ubove. 
b, Clic:.nts .r<",Scrve the right to tennlnu\1.1 ll1e r~~1miscntr.tl'i011 with or without 
e£1usc, and 1ihall noti(y the Attomcy in writing (\'f nny such lctminatlon; provlc!ctl, however, that 
in the event C1ic111s renninutc the repr~sc11U1lio11 for trny Jcason, Clients mll!;t r ay Attorney the 
iipplicnble conciugcnq· fee amounr spcdfiecJ in Soncfon J :l.lld Section 2 11bovc on sums, it' any, 
recovered by Clienls at llny future t.ime (whether through a judicial proc1~ecling, scltleme1it, or 
ol:he.rwise) in connection with the LawsuiL lu the event of nny suc.h lflrmination, Clients ngrce lo 
prnmptly pay the Attorney for ull scrviccli rendered by lhe Attorney per this Agreement mid for 
all Cosls im;urred pursuant to the term.~ of this Agreement. prior to receipt of 11oticc of the 
lermin;1tion by tbc AttCl.rney. 
c. Upon termination o( this rtlp.resentation by eill1cr party, Attorney agree.~ lo 
coopcrnlc with any s11i:cesr,or counsel to nccommoclate a smooth tr1rnRilion of the rcprcscnlntion, 
and upon reque~t of Clknts to turn over to City all p;1pcrs relating to the Litigation. 
5. Joint&QJ1re-sentution. Inasmuch ns ~ !11.wyer is prohibited by .Rule 1.7 of the Rules 
of l'rnfossional Respon~ibility from representing multiple parties i11 matte.rs involving the snrne 
subject matter without full clisclosnm to and wrillen waiver by the parties, it will be necessary for 
each ol' the Clients to consent to Altomcy's joi11t representation of all Clients collectively. 
ti. At the present time, in light of the Settlement Agreement aml 
notwillmaricling \he City's ongoing oblig11tions of payment to Ccdor V11Ucy under the terms of 
tile Se.tllc1m:nt Agreement, Clic.nts' rcspectlve intorests appem to be aligned, und the ptuties 
agree thtlt there arc ·no focts that would support aclverne duim~ between or among the Clients. 
Cliont~ agree and acknowledge tlHtl !"acts can come. to light, nm! cil'c~rnstances ca11 change, such 
that the Clients' respective "interests may come into conflict. Bach of the Clients ucknowledgos 
that Attorney c.ould nM reprMent either of I.he ClientH against the other. In the event that uny 
fact:> or c:ircunrntances were to r1rise crcnling u con:flict between or among any of lhc Clients, 
AttClri;cy may be rnquiretl to withdraw from representing all of the Clients, und Attorney's 
withrlniw~/ may require thnt each of the Client.~ hire other coLrnscl. Cl!eurn acknowloclgr- they 
1111ty incur utlorncy foe1; tmd cost.~ .ln r~onnection with e,c\ncnting their new a_ttomey on the matter. 
ti. Joint representation also has conseql1cncc3 for the applicubllity of the 
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attorn1:>y-clie111 privilege. Spccifici1lly, c:omnn;nicmions between tlle jointly reprcse.n!cd Clients 
nnd Allorncy urc privileged us to third parties but arc no1 privileged us lo the CJienli; which ure 
being jointly represented, Accordingly, Ai.torney is free lo shure with bolh Clknts 
co111mu11ica(ions ~\lid infonnntiou whic.h Attorney hos or obtains from nny of the Clients 
respecting the instant cnso. Jn the event that Atwrney receives any infornrntion from one of the 
Clients with instructions lhnt it be kept confid~ntin! from the otJ1el', Attorney mny bo required to 
withdraw from reprc8cnting all of the Clients, u.rilcss the party disclosing the information 
consents lo tl1e disclosme o:f tile information ~o (he other nftcr consu.llation. If Attorney is 
re.quired to withdraw, cnch of the Clie!ltS may incur 11ltorney foes um! costs in connection wilb 
educating llmir new altomey on the .~jtuatiur. . 
6. ~onJJicls of Interest. Clients ack11owlcclgc that Attorney is a large luw finn whidi 
lrns represented, and continues to represent, mt1ny different corpornte Qnd individunl client.~ with 
various business interests in numerous industrie:;. Attorney's clients include land dewlopcrs, 
home builders, contmctors, water right holders, nlLlities, contract bidders, landowners, oil, gas 
und .mining cmn~1nnies, lenders, lnndlo~cls, 1enants, nmon.g milny others who hnve o~ inny in the 
fulwc hav~, de.a lings within Jhe Cily. It is l'os~illlc 1hat, duri.ng the time. All t)rney is represeming 
Cl ltims 1.rnd1: 1· Lhl.s AJ:!reeiuenl, Att.orney mny l>e nsked to represent in te rests, belonging Lo one of 
ALlnrncy':; pn::sc·11l or t'uture clients, which arc ndverse to Clients' in tere~ls. lf such n confl ict 
were !ti ~r.ise bi:Lwecn Clicals ' iutcrcsts nnd tbO:\C of another presen l or ful11re clf.r.n t of Aum·ney, 
Attorney reserve~ the right to represent the interests of tho other client with respect to thnl 
parllculnr mnltcr, so Jong ns no substantial interests of the other client nrc directly adverse to 
Client~' sul1~tanlial int·erest~ in the inntte1· for which Attorney is e11gnged. 
<1. Clients umkrstaua, con~cnt, and ngree that Allorney may continue to 
represent, or rnny undertake in the foturn to represent, existing or new client.~ in nay mi1ttcr that ls 
not subslanlially related to the matter under this Agreement, evei1 if the interc~ts of sucti other 
clients in those other nrntters are directly adverse to Clie1its', and even if those other m<1tters 
ripen into pr .involve liligalion between S\1ch other clients 11\ld tho Clients , Tn such a case, 
Attorney will condJJct itself regarding Clients' interests as required by the Rules of Profo~sional 
Re.spon~ibility. 
b. Altonwy u11d Clients agree thnl Clients' Jiror.pcctivc. 111r,rcemenl uod 
co nsc:nt 10 snch ccmfllc!ing represcn t<1li o'll shnll not nppl y In any instance whe.Te, as n rcs11ll of 
/\t tomr.y's rcprel-:mnto l lon of Clien ts, Atlorney has ollt.nined sen1diive, proprietary or ol her 
cou Cl dr.11ti1tl iuformnl.ion of 11 11on1rnblic n11tl1rc !lint, If known to. suoh other client, could be us~.d 
to the 111a1ci rinl dl.'llldvmnngc of Clie.nl<;' i1t!eresl:i 111 tlrn m1111cr i11v0Jveci . Nor shun ii apply to 
pernill AM rrn;y to repr(:se11l any cli el11 ag11 ins1 Cliil11ls in nny liligntiou or sirnilnr proceeding in 
whic.h 1\tlomcy reprc1\cnto Clients. 
c. Attorney nnd Clienl1l .further ngrei;: thnt nothing stntcd herein is intended HS 
n waivc1· or consent by Clients (unless spedficnlly find clearly set forll1 herein), or n narrowing of 
the J'equirements of, the Rules of l.'rofellsional Rcsponsib.ility regarding conflicts of lnteresl. 
rt. Cl i.ents acknowledge rhcy lrnde.rstanc1 the potential consequences of ~ucb u 
prospective conflict of intc~rest waiver by viltuc of their busi1lcss sophisticution mid experience 














c. Clients each (;onse1n Lo Attorney's continued representation of Cedar 
Valley in connection with Ille enforcemen1 oJ, or ;iny clispute ari.~ing from or between the City 
nncl Ceclar Valley re'/atitlJ\ tu, the Scttlcmon: Agrecnwnt. Should a displ1le nri~e between the Cily 
und Cedttr Vulley rdating 10 tile Se1tlemeut Agrec111ent, cKcept as may be required by tbe Utah 
Rules of t>rofc~sio an l Responsib ili ty, Attorney will represent the intem;t~ of Cedal' Vulley 
ngnlnst rhe in!tHosts of the CiLy. City cuminlly htis ~epnrntc counsel us to the Settlement 
Agreement, one! u11de~l<1 nds !hat it must <..'Onlim;1e rntnining other counsel to represent its interests 
as to t/ic Scttk.mc.nt Agreement. 
f. Nothing in this Agrecnwnt is i1)tended to nor shall operule 11s q waiver of 
the attorney cltenc und work product privileg-es that nttachecl to communications between 
Attorney nnd Cedm Vu'Hey pr-)or to this AgreemenL, :111~ informtttion rehlting to the Settlemenl 
Agreement or Cedar Valley Wetter Company, LlC JI. Eagle Mountaill Ci~Y. Civ. No. 09042122, 
Fo11rll1 .fociicial District. Court. 
7. ,$_yltlel11J}:(IJ..Jmn.\llise.. In event that P.KH and/or its insurcr(s) 1m1ke an offer of 
scltlemc.11t to Client~. 11nd they cannot mutually t1gree on the terms of ncgotinted settlement of lhe 
1JrWSl1it, then the client~ ngrce to firnt negol.iate in gcmd foiLh. Fnilhig an agre~ment t11e11, the 
parties shall mediate their dispute beforn a mediator selected nmong the t.wo choices of the 
Clieuls by a flip of n coin. 
a. In the event the dispute is not resolved by medintiou, each of the Clients 
shrill select un urbitxalor and the two selected arbitrators 1>hall se.lect n third mhitrntor. The 
nrbitrnt.ion panel shall rcceivo slmultn11tlo11s posilion papers from each of the Clients within 14 
duys of their selection, ancl reply position papers within? days fol.lowing tlrnc. 
b. AL the req•ic:; t of either of the Clients_, without uny prior discovery by the 
Clic-nls, the p<1ncl !\hall conduct• 11 no tnCJrc than 2 honr bearing pcrmitli:ng e.nch C1fo11t to present 
their re:1sons for accepting or rcjec.:ting Lhc iielllcmcnl ofrer in accordance with lhc !Jiternational 
Instil.Lite for Conflict Prcvcnlion & Resolution Rules for Non-Administered A.rbitralion in effect 
ns of the datu or lhis Agreement. The decision of the three ·arbitrators regiHding whether to 
ucc.cpl or reject the pending offer shall be bi11diog LHl the CHentH. 
c. Tbe arbitrntion shall be governed by ll1e Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, 
ULah Code Ann. § 78-11-10.l e1 seq ., nuc.l the dt.: r.i,qion rendered by the 11rbitrulors nmy he 
enl'nrcecl, if necessary, by rei>ort to Fourth Judich\l 'D i ~ tr ict Co\,l rl oi' lJl<ih County, Utah. The 
place of arbitrntion sh~l .l Im Provo, Utld1. 
d. Each of tb.c Clicnt;; !!hull p•1y 1111e-holf of the costs nnd foes re.lntud to the 
mediated and/or arbitrarcd settlement. Att01'11ey is not obligated to pt1y any costs o:f resolving 
such n deadlock. Ally amount recovered by way of a 1>ettlement accepted hercunr.1er shall be 
subjecr to the tenns am1 conditio,n;; of th Ls Agrccmcnl. 
e. 1\ttonu:y :ihtt\\ 1101 ruprnsent ciU1er oi' \he Client~ or olh~rwisc participate 
in the urbili.'a1ion. If they want to be reprcscnlecl in the urbitrnlion, each of the Clients must retain 
irs own legt1l counsel 
8. ~Jl;c;.t:JJ(!.!.1.£.Q,v.u.'..r<>v i ~i Qll!3.· 
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rnl·'""m ...... , 1•.·1 A I ~J ,); . . : 
ll. Clients shall fully coq,crnw with the Attorney and provide 111! infonm1tion 
relevant to the issues and subject matter o.1' this Agreement; pay nll expenses as required herein; 
keep Attorney npp.rised oJ the whereabouts of iii: principals and ofl1cials; cooperntc in Lhc 
prcparatio11 und Lrial of the Luws\lit; app~1H on :·: .. asonao!e notice for depo~ilions 1md court 
appe11rnnccs, Mid comply with nll rcnsonnbt(: J\)quc:;ts made by Attorney in co11nectio11 with the 
proparalion fine! pre1;entntion of the Liligntion. 
b. Clients agre(~ that as~;ochi1c cuunsel and suppo.rt staff may be employed nt 
tl1e cliscretio.n nnd cxpeu~e of Attorney, and that a11y attorney so employed 1m1y be designated to 
nppear on Ciiy'~ behalf or undertake City's reprcse/itation in the Lawsuil. 
c. All of Attorney's wm·.k product generated tu1cfer this Agreement will be 
owned by Lhe Attorney. · 
d. If in the course of representing multiple clients the Attorney dete.rmincs in 
its sole discretion that a conflict of interest exists, Lhe Attorney will nollfy all of the affected 
clienls of-such contlict and may withdraw from rnprese11tfog any one or more of the multiple 
clie11!.~ to the extcnl such a withclrnw~I would be permitted or reqL1ired by i1pplic~1hle provision of 
th1) Utah Rules of P.rofossional Conduc.l. 
e. A.tt.orney cannot fllld does noL wtmant, predit:t or guarantee resu.lts of the 
final ontcomc of this or any case.. CLIENTS AGREE AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT 
ATI'ORNEY HAS MADE NO PROMISES, REPRESENTATIONS OR GUARANTEES 
REGJ\RDlNG THE OUTCOME OF OR UKELY AMOUNT RECOVERABLE FilOM 
CITY'S CLAIMS IN THE LAWSUIT. 
f. This Agrnement .includeo the entire agrnemeut between the Clicuts and thu 
/\ttorney regarding this matter, and can only be modified if ;mother written ugreemeut is signed 
hy the Clients ;m<l the Attorney. This J\grcement shall be binding upon bot11 the Clients und lhc 
Atlu1ney and tbcir respective hcfrs, legal representatives ancl st1ccessors and assigns in interest. 
g. [n the event a di~pute shou.ld arise between Attorney nricl Clients with 
regard to the: foe whid1 .is to be paid by Clients lu Attorney, any such dii;pule slrnll be re~olved 
through cnmp\dsory arbitrntion in accordance with !he rules of urbitrntion, or fee disputes of the 
State B:ir o [' llinh, before the Fee Dispute Coinmince. 
h. Clients represent that Attorney ha.~ advised Clients Jn writing of the 
d"Hirabitity of seeking and 1111~ been given n rcu.~onnble oppmtunity to seek the advice of 
\nclept!ndent lcgnl counsel on the terms M<i conditions oJ' this Agrnement. 
i. C!ienls acknowledge 1ht1t Attomq is not providfog tax advice to eilher of 
them ill corn:cclion with this cn~ugerne.nl, nud tlrnt they lwvc teucl trnd \lflClcrsttrnd Attorney's 
"Statement Df Policy Rcgnrding Tax Advice" that ii; incorporated into this Agrccmenl ns Exhibit 
A. 
rN WlTNESS WI-IEHEOF, the parties b.ive r.allsed this Agree.me11t t·o be r.xecutcd c'.S of 










Mark 0. Morris (4636) 
Bradley R Cahoon (5925) 
M. Lane Molen (11724) 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1531 




Attorneys for Eagle Mountain City 
: ·. 
· .. .. 
' . 
IN THE FOURTH JUDiCIAL DISTRICT .COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARSONS KINGHORN &HARRlS, P.C., 
Defendant. 




WILLIAMS & HUNT, P .C., 
Third-Party Defendants . 
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l. I, Ifo Pili, declare as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years, a resident of the State of Utah, and am fully . 
competent in all resp_ects to testify regarding the matters set forth herein. . . 
2. I have been City Administrator for Eagle Mountain City since approximately 
August of2012. 
3. Before that time I served aS ·a Management Analyst for the City from September 
of 2006 to April of 2007 as Economic Development Director and Assistant .City Administrator; 
from approximately May-of2007 J;llltiJ. beco:r¢ng City.Administrator. 
4. As Assistant City Administrator and· later as City Administrator I became 
generally acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the lawsuit between Cedar Valley 
Water Company ("CVWC") and the City (the "Underlying Lawsuit"). 
5. During the Underlying Lawsuit, I conducted, or was present at, a number of 
conversations with Gerald Kinghorn concerning the Underlying Lawsuit and, specificail.y among 
. other things, (i) the facts and circumstances regarding the 2000 Town Well # 1 Capacity Purchase 
Agreement ("2000 Purchase Agreement") predating and/or leading up to CVWC filing the 
Underlying Lawsuit, and (ii) the City's position and arguments in the Underlying Lawsuit. 
6. Mr. Kinghorn told me and others on more than one occasion that the City had no 
liability to CVWC for obligations under the 2000 Purchase Agreement. 
7. According to Mr. Kinghorn, one of the City's primary defenses to CVWC's 
claims was that CVWC had given credits to the City against the $720 impact fee associated with 
. . 




· 8. There crune a time in the Underlying Lawsuit when the court awarded CVWC at 
least $4 l 8;871.34~ plus attorney fees; for· breachin~ the 2000 Purchase Agreement. :This came as 
a surprise to '.?le, given what I had ·been told by .PKH. since before the Underlying -Lawsuit 
began-that the City had no liability. 
9. I thereafter came to realize that .PKH's advice over the course of the preyious 
twelve years or so had put the City in the position· of being sued in the Underlying· Lawsuit and 
vulnerable t6 a potential judgment. in a very significant amount. , ! •, .. . . · .. . , 
10. · After the credit letters promised by Mr. Kinghorn could never be found and 
produced, and realizing ~t- PKH's advice regarding the 2000 Purchase. .Agreement had 
subjected the City to significant exposure, I believed that the City should hold PKH responsible 
· for any damages it incurred, and intended to recommend to the City that it seek recovery for 
those damages, and for any further damages it would incur by way of jury verdict, settlement, or 
otherwise. 
11. In December of 2012, the City began settlement discussions -with CVWC hoping 
to avoid a jury trial and potentially enoirnous judgment which the City lacked resources to 
satisfy. 
12. The City and· CVWC participated in fill unsuccessful mediation on December 13, 
2012. In that December 2012 mediation, I do not recall the possibility of the City's sharing in 
proceeds of the City's eventual malpractice claim being raised by either party. When the City's 
mayor authorized me to negotiate directly with CVWC, it was my idea to suggest that the City 
may be able to · share proceeds of any settlement or judgment in the malpractice claim against 
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PKH that I had already determined would be in·tbe City's best interest. These .discussions with 
CVWC took place primarily during January 201 J;· . . ~.. .~ ·. 
13 : . The City and CVWC' eventuby settled the Underlying Lawsuit, with the ,City 
obligating itself to pay to CVWC a total of over $4.5 million oyer time. The-City later ente_red 
into the Contingent Fee Agreement in connection with settling the Underlying Lawsuit; · 
14. In ·proposing to share co~tingent pr?ceeds :in an eventual settlement or lawsuit 
.. 
with CVWC;.the City never .intended to transfer or assign the claim, or control over the claim to .. 1 -
CVWC. During the time the City was negotiating settlement with CVWC ·and considering the · 
Contrngent Fee Agreement, it was always my understanding that the City would bring the claims _ 
and control the litigation. 
15. Also as pa.rt of the settlement negotiations, we discussed using Snell & Wilmer 
L.L.P. as the attorneys to bring the malpractice lawsuit. The City agreed to using Snell & 
Wilmer because Snell & Wilmer was a logical choice to represent the City in the malpractice 
lawsuit. It was ~eady well acquainted wit4 the complicated facts of the underlying case and the 
do~uments related thereto. Further, Snell attorneys had been instrumental in exposing PK.H's 
misrepresentations and malpractice through the processes of the Underlying Lawsuit. As such, 
we belie~ed Snell & Wilmer could litigate the case effectively and efficiently. 
16. The City Attorney at the time of the settlement, Jeremy Cook from PKH, never 
indicated to me that an agreement to share proceeds with CVWC of a malpractice claim would 
be improper or voidable. 
17. If the City and CVWC had not entered into an agreement to share proceeds as part 








. · ; 
have pursued, the · legal, . malpractice . claim: ·to· :-recover whatever . damages· PKH's ' .. . · 
misrepresentations and poor legal_ advice had caused the City. 
·: .- , -, t • • 
18. · · Since· the settlement, I have been one of~o primary points of contact for the-City · · ·. :· · ,. 
in communicating with our .attorneys, Snell & :Wilmer LL.P ., regarding , the legal" malpractice 
case against PKH. These have incfoded face-to-face meetings, phone calls, letters;- and emails · 
concerning case updates, strategy and coordination of the City's claims. ·. . · : : · · .. 
. "• ~ 
... 
· . . 
19. During the course ofits·attempt1o·resolve the·claim/ the City through its attorneys ·-: . . · . · .. c. ' . 
Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P.., provided PKH with materials in hopes. of persuading PKH to settle the·. • . · ·· 
claim for a reasonable amount. Among other things, these; documents included the expert reports . 
of a· retired judge and a law professor; each of whom had opined that PKH had breached the 
standard of care and committed legal malpractice as to the City. . 
20. The City and PKH attempted mediation on October 30, 2013, before this suit was 
filed. The mediation was unsuccessful. PKH made no settlement offer at the 2013 mediation 
that I was willing to bother recommending to t?-e City Council. 
21. · . Since the -City filed this Lawsuit on December 10; 2013, it has not received any 
settlement offer from PKH. During the pendency of the Lawsuit, I have not been inyolved with 
any conversation with any · CVWC representative concerning the prosecution of claims or 
strategies undertaken. Further, I am not aware of any other City official having such a 
conversation. In all of my communications with our counsel on this matter, no one from CVWC 
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! .. 
I declare. l:IIlder penalty .ef. perjUty, pursuant t0 ·Utah Code· Ann. § 78B-5-7.0S; -.that~tb.e· ·: .!" .:: . • .. · • ' · 
foregoing statements are true to the .b'est of my knowledge, information, and. belief: · ... ·. 
,: . EX~cuted on this .· ((, ~ dli.y ofMarcb,.2015. · ·" · · 
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Mark 0. Morris (4636) 
Bradley R Cahoon (5925) 
M. Lane Molen (11724) 
Snell & Willner L.L.P. . 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
. Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1531 




Attorneys for Eagle Mo~ntain City 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN· AND FOR ' · 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARSONS KINGHORN & HARRIS, P.C., 
Defendant. 




WILLIAMS & HUNT, P.C., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
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DECLARATION OF MAYOR 
CHRISTOPHER PENGRA · 




I, Christopher Pengra, declare as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years, a resident of the State of Utah, and am fully : 
competent in all respects to testify regarding the matters set forth herein. . ~ ' ': 
2. I am the Mc:tyor of Eagle Mountain City ("City"). I was elected Mayor in 
November 2013 and began serving in 2014. 
3. As Mayor I have become familiar with the facts and circumstances involved with· 
the City's legal malpractice claim against Parsons, .Kinghorn and Harris, P.C. ('~PKH") .. 
4. Since.·taking office, I have beep. one of two primary points of contact. for the. City .- .. 
in communicating- with our. attorneys, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P ., regarding the · legal · malpractice 
. .. . . 
case against Parsons Kinghorn & Harris, P.C. These have included face-to-face ~eetings, phone 
calls, letters, and emails concerning case updates, strategy and coordination of the City's claims. 
In all of my- communications with our counsel on this matter, no one from the Cedar Valley 
Water Company ("CVWC") has directed any communications to me concerning the prosecution 
of claims or strategies undertaken. 
5. Since I became Mayor in' 2014, no one has presented to me a settlement offer 
made by PKH, nor am I aware of any settlement .offer of any kind being made by PKH in this 
case since the Complaint was filed. 
I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-705, that the 
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Executed on this Jj_ ii:aay.ofMaroh, 2015. 
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Mark 0. Morris (4636) 
Bradley R Cahoon (5925) 
M. Lane Molen (11724) 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
SaltLakeCity, Utah 84101-1531 




Attorneys for Eagle Mountain City 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARSONS KINGHORN & HARRIS, P.C., 
Defondant. 








Civil No. 130300194 
Judge Brady 
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I, Heather Jackson, declare as follows : 
1. I am over the age of 18 years, a resident of the State of Utah, and am fully 
competent in all respects to testify regarding the matters set forth herein. 
2. I am a former Mayor of Eagle Mountain City ("City"). I was elected Mayor in 
November 2007 and began serving in 2008. Prior to my time as Mayor, I had served on the City 
Council since 2006. 
3. As Mayor I became aware of claims asserted by Cedar Valley Water Company 
("CVWC") concerning alleged breaches of the 2000 Town Well #1 Capacity Purchase 
Agreement, dated February 15, 2000 ("2000 Purchase Agreement"). 
4. At all times since I took office until his death in 2012, Jerry Kinghorn, the City 
Attorney and partner with the firm of Parsons, Kinghorn & Harris, was known to me and to my 
knowledge, all of the City Councilmembers to be the person most knowledgeable about the 2000 
Purchase Agreement, its administration and the history of the City's performance under the 2000 
Purchase Agreement. 
5. I consulted with Mr. Kinghorn on many occasions concerning CVWC's claims, 
and discussed with Mr. Kinghorn my concerns regarding the City's potential liability for those 
claims, and about the City's defenses to those claims. Mr. Kinghorn provided advice to me and 
to the City Council in various settings including in closed session council meetings, 
conversations, email, and through official correspondence. 
6. During the course of those discussions, Mr. Kinghorn advised me and City 
councilmembers that a primary defense to CVWC's claims in the lawsuit that was ultimately 
brought ("Underlying Litigation") was a credit mechanism contained in the Contract, which the 
City could automatically invoke against CVWC. 
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7. Mr. Kinghorn also advised me and the City Council that there were credit letters 
that absolved the City of its obligations to collect the $720 Well #1 impact fees and pay those 
monies over to CVWC under the 2000 Purchase Agreement. 
8. Mr. Kinghorn 's statements about the credit letters turned out to be unfounded, and 
I later concluded that the purported letters did not exist to support the credit mechanism that Mr. 
Kinghorn had for years asserted had been invoked by CVWC. 
9. I also came to believe that PKH's advice regarding the administration of the 2000 
Purchase Agreement had subjected the City to significant exposure, and that the City should hold 
PKH responsible and seek recovery for those damages and any further damages it would incur 
by way of jury verdict, settlement, or otherwise. 
IO. Around December of2012, the City engaged in settlement discussions with 
CVWC. The City and CVWC participated in an unsuccessful mediation on December 13, 2012. 
11 . In the context of those settlement discussions and mediation, I do not recall that 
the possibility of the City's sharing any portion of proceeds o"fthe City's potential malpractice 
claim against PKH was raised by either party during the 2012 mediation in the Underlying 
Lawsuit. 
12. Following the unsuccessful mediation, I authorized Ifo Pili to negotiate directly 
with CVWC regarding a potential settlement, which of course would ultimately have to be 
approved by the City Council. I Wlderstood that in the course of settlement discussions that 
occurred mostly in January 2013, Ifo Pili, on behalf of the City, and CVWC first discussed the 
possibility of including as part of the settlement an agreement to share proceeds of any claims the 
City asserted against PKH by reason of its malpractice concerning the 2000 Purchase Agreement. 
13. I was comfortable with the idea of the City's retaining Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. to 
bring the claims. Snell & Wilmer was a logical choice to represent the City in the malpractice 
lawsuit because it was already well acquainted with the complicated factual history of the events 
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giving rise to the claims, and the documents related thereto. Further, Snell & Wilmer attorneys 
had been instrumental in exposing PKH's misrepresentations to and wrong legal advice through 
the processes of the Underlying Lawsuit. As such, we believed Snell & Wilmer could litigate the 
case effectively and efficiently. 
14. I do not remember Mr. Cook, the City Attorney in February, 2014, or anyone else 
from PKH stating, before the Settlement Agreement was entered into on February 5, 2013, that a 
contingent agreement to share proceeds of a malpractice lawsuit would be improper or voidable. 
15. Regardless of whether the City had entered into an agreement to share proceeds as 
part of any settlement, I believe the City would have pursued the legal malpractice claim to 
recover damages it incurred in the Underlying Litigation. 
16. After settling the Underlying Lawsuit in February 2013, the City then attempted 
in good faith to resolve the claim against PKH without having to file a lawsuit. The City made 
extraordinary efforts to avoid publicity about the case, and we made a conscious choice to not 
pursue Mr. Kinghom's estate. 
17. Since the February 2013 settlement, and until I left office at the end of2013, I 
was one of two primary points of contact for the City in communicating with our attorneys, Snell 
& Wilmer L.L.P., regarding the legal malpractice case against PKH. These included face-to-face 
meetings, phone calls, letters, and emails concerning case updates, strategy and coordination of 
the City's claims. 
18. As part of the efforts to settle the legal malpractice claim against PKH, the City 
and PKH attempted mediation on October 30, 2013. The mediation was unsuccessful. PKH 
made no settlement offer at the mediation that I was willing to recommend to the City Council 
for approval. 
19. Since the unsuccessful 2013 mediation until I left my position as Mayor, I am 
aware of no settlement offers of any kind made by PKH in this case. Also during that time I was 
003957 
not involved with any conversation with CVWC about litigation strategy or any other decision 
making on any issue in the case. Further, I am not aware of any other City official having such a 
conversation. 
I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-705, that the 
foregoing statements are true to the best of my knowledge, infonnation, and belief. 




FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY, 
Plaintiff, RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
vs. 
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS, 
Defendant. 
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS, Case No. 130300194 
Third-Party Plaintiff, JUdge James Brady 
vs. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT, P.C.; et al. 
Third-Party Defendants. 
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
Defendant seeks the dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint on the basis that Plaintiff bas assigned 
interests in its legal malpractice lawsuit in a manner that violates public policy. l:ilaintiff's 
complaint includes three separate causes of action. The first cause of action is based on a claim 
that Defendant negligently performed its duties a legal counsel for Plaintiff. The second cause of 
action is based on a claim that Defendants breached its fiduciary duties as legal counsel to 
Plaintiff. The third cause of action is based on a claim that Defendant breached contractual 
obligations owed to Plaintiff as legal counsel. All three causes of action are based on the 
attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant, and Plaintiff alleges Defendant's 
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deficient legal services violated standards, established in both tort and contract. All three of 
Plaintiffs claims have in common Lhat they allege legal malpractice by Defendant. The parties 
briefed and argued this motion on the basis of the <lSsignment of a legal malpractice claim and 
did not diflerentiate between the three types of malpractice alleged in the complaint. Neither 
party argued for individual causes of action to be dismissed or to survive. After reviewing the 
memoranda, affidavits, exhibits, pleadings on file and hearing the parties' oral arguments, the 
court took this motion under advisement. Having considered the facts and issues presented, the 
court now enters this ruling GRANTING defendant's motion. In granting this motion, the Court 
intends this order to dis.miss all three causes of action, without prejudice, subject to Plaintiff's 
right to re-file its Complaint if it meets the conditions stated below. 
The standard for summary judgement applied by the Court is that summary judgment 
"shall be rendered if the pleadings, deposition, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, 
together with the affidavits, jf any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), URCP. 
Additionally, "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [are viewed] in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party." Jackson v Mateus, 2003 UT 18, §2, 70 P .3d 78 (internal 
citation omitted). Summary judgement "denies the opportunity of trial (and so] should be granted 
only when it clearly appears that there is no reasonable probability the party moved against could 
prevail." Utah Stale Univ. Of AgTi C. And Applied ci. V. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 7 I 5, 720 n. l.4 
(Utah 1982). 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
Defendant's motion addresses two legal issues, 1) Does Eagle Mountain City's (''EMC") 
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Settlement Agreement with Cedar Valley Water Company ("CVWC") and their joint Contingent 
Fee Agreement with Snell & Will mer ("SW"), (here after jointly referred to as "Agreements") 
constitute an assignment of a malpractice claim; and, 2) If it is an assignment of a malpractice 
claim does it bar EMC from pursuing its malpractice claims against Parsons Kinghorn Harris 
("PKI-I"). Both parties spent much time and effort informing the Court of the facts and issues 
raised in the underlying case, most of which are not material to either question. From the 
affidavits and other evidence presented, the comt finds the following facts are both material and 
uncontested: 
l. EMC is suing PKH claiming legal malpractice based on tort and contract theories. 
2. EMC alleges, among other things, that: 
a. Pursuant to the 2001 Town Well #1 Capacity Purchase Agreement, an Impact Fee 
Ordinance ("IFO") was enacted by EMC, City Ordinance No.'00-02, in 2000. 
b. Under the terms ofthe IFO, EMC would collect impact fees under certain specific 
triggering events from "development applicants" that transferred water rights to 
EMC which relied on Well #1 as the point of diversion. 
c. EMC did not collect impact foes from developers based on PKH's alleged 
incorrect advice. 
d. PKH, tlu·ough attorney Gerry Kinghorn, who was EMC's City Attorney, allegedly 
incorrectly advised EMC from 2000 through 2011 not to collect impact fees. 
e. PKH's improper advice allegedly damaged EMC because EMC is required to pay 
CVWC money it would not have had to pay if EMC had collected impact fees 
from developers, including $4,560,000 that EMC is required to pay CVWC as 
Page 3 
002628 
part of the February 5, 2013 Settlement of the Underlying Case. This allegedly 
constitutes professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of 
contract. 
3. Snell & Willmer represented CVWC in the Underlying Case against EMC. 
4. On February 5, 2013, EMC and CVWC finalized the settlement of the underlying case 
and memorialized it in a signed written Settlement Agreement and a separate Contingent 
Fee Agreement. 
5. Excluded from the Release contained in the Settlement Agreement "are any and all claims 
[EMC] may have against its own attorneys [PKH], as set forth in the Contingent Fee 
Agreement identified in paragraph 7" of the Settlement Agreement. 
6. Paragraph 7 of the Settlement Agreement, entitled .. Integration," states: Except as 
expressly stated herein, this Agreement and a companion Contingent Fee Agreement, 
contain the entire agreement and understanding of the parties with respect to the subject 
matter hereof, and integrates all prior conversations, discussions or undertakings of 
whatever kind or nature and may only be modified by a subsequent writing duly executed 
by the parties hereto. 
7. EMC and CVWC entered into the Contingent Fee Agreement in connection with settling 
the underlying Case. 
8. The Contingent Fee Agreement is binding upon EMC, CVWC and SW and their 
respective heirs, legal representatives and successors and assigns in interest. 
9. The Contingent Fee Agreement provides among other things that: 
a. As part of the settlement of the Underlying Case, EMC is obligated to file and 
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prosecute the Malpractice Case against PKH. 
b. Both EMC and CVWC retain SW as their attorney to prosecute the Malpractice 
Case on EMC's and CVWC's behalf against PKH. 
c. Since both CVWC and EMC are clients of SW, "communications between the 
jointly represented Clients and [SW] are priviteged as to third parties but are not 
privileged as to the Clients which are being jointly represented. Accordingly, 
[SW] is free to share with both Clients communications and information which 
[SW] has or obtains from any of the Clients respecting the [Malpractice Case]." 
d. EMC, CVWC., and SW will each receive one-third of any recovery from PKH in 
the Malpractice Case, after payment of costs, and absent an appeal. 
e. SW's one-third contingent fee is calculated on the amount of sums recovered from 
PKH (including its insurers), after out of pocket expenses are first deducted from 
such recovery. 
f. All costs incurred in connection with the Malpractice Case shall be paid by 
CVWC, including payments in advance when requested by SW, and such costs 
shall be reimbursed to CVWC first from any recovery realized in the Malpractice 
Case. Those costs include ''sums expended for subpoenas, photos, photocopies, 
scanning, facsimiles, telephone calls, exhibits used at hearings, depositions, court 
reporter costs, repo11s, witness statements, expert witnesses, and all other out-of-
pocket expenses directly incurred in investigating or litigating the [Malpractice 
Case against PKH]. 
g. Costs shall also include the out of pocket expenses that [CVWC] and [EMC] 
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incurred in connection with the prosecution of the claims on the 2000 Agreement, 
which amounts the patties agree shall be reimbursed from the first proceeds of any 
recovery on the [Ma1practice Case against PKH]. 
h. EMC cannot settle the Malpractice Case without CVWC's consent Absent 
mutual agreement, the parties must first mediate and subsequently submit, if 
necessary, to mandatory arbitration. 
1. EMC and CVWC consent to SW's continued representation of CVWC in 
connection with the enforcement of, or any dispute arising from or between 
[EMC] and [CVWC) relating to the Settlement Agreement [in the Underlying 
Case]. Should a dispute arise between [EMC] and [CVWC] relating to the 
Settlement Agreement. except as may be required by the Utah Rules of 
Professional Responsibility, [SW] viill represent the interests of [CVWC] against 
the interests of [EMC]. 
10. John Walden signed the Contingent Fee Agreement on behalf of CVW C as its Managing 
Member. 
11 . Ifo Pili signed the Contingent Fee Agreement on behalf of EMC as its City Administrator. 




Docs the Settlement Agreement and the Contingent Free Agreement Constitute an 
Assignment of EMC's Claim of Legal Malpractice. 
It is important to note that although PKH asks the court to declare the Agreements are 
11ne11forceable, nothing in this ruling is intended to rnle on the enforceability or respective rights 
of SW, CVWC and EMC in the Settlement Agreement and Contingent Fee Agreement. These are 
issues bet\-veen SW, CVWC and EMC and are not before this court. A resolution of those issues 
would require, at a minimum, the inclusion of SW and CVWC as parties, and an opp01iunity to 
be heard. The issue before this court is not the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement and 
Contingent Fee Agreement between its interested parties, but rather whether as a consequence of 
entering these agreements, has EMC apparently assigned interests in a legal malpractice claim, 
and if so, does the assignment violate public policy. 
EMC argues the Contingency Fee Agreement is me.rely a means of EMC sharing 
proceeds with CVWC, a common practice. The Cou1t disagrees. EM C's argument that it has not 
assigned the claim to CVWC are inconsistent with the content of the Agreement. Even the 
Recitals to the Contingency Fee Agreement provides that, "City [EMC] and Cedar Valley 
[CVWC] desire to retain Attorney to bring the Lawsuit against PKH ... "This provision 
begs the question, if CVWC did not receive even an assignment of interest in EM C's claims, 
why does CVWC "desire to retain the attorney" to pursue the claim? Paragraph 5, 5 b.; and 6 e. 
of the Contingency Fee Agreement also support the position that EMC and CVWC believe they 




The Court finds the following provisions of the Contingent Fee Agreement grant some of 
EMC's interests 1n the current case to CVWC: 
a. As part of the settlement of the Underlying Case, EMC agrees to ... file and 
prosecute a complaint against PKH ... alleging negligence and related 
malpractice claims, solely on the terms and conditions of this agreement 
(Contingent Fee Agreement, Recitals .Paragraph C). 
b. City [EMC] and Cedar Valley [CVWC) desire to retain Attorney [SW] to bring 
the lawsuit against PKH ... (Contingent Fee Agreement, RecitaJs Paragraph D). 
c. . .. communications between the jointly represented Clients [EMC and CVWC] 
and Attorney [SW) are privileged as to third parties but are not privileged as to the 
Clients which are being jointly represented. (Contingent Fee Agreement, 
Paragraph 5.b) 
d. In the Settlement Agreement, City [EMC] and Cedar Valley [CVWC] agreed that 
after payment of costs, each would receive one third ... of the recovery, if any, 
from PKH in the Lawsuit. (Contingent Fee Agreement Recital Paragraph E). 
e. Clients each agree that Attorney (SW] is entitled to one-third (I/3) of the sums 
recovered from PKH (including its insurers), after out of pocket costs are first 
deducted from such recovery. (Contingent Fee Agreement, Paragraph 1). 
f. . .. all costs incurred in connection with the Lawsuit shall be paid by Cedar Valley 
[CVWC] but all amount of such costs shall be first repaid paid from any recovery 
received. (Contingent Fee Agreement Paragraph, 3.a). 
g. In the event PKH (and/or its insurers) make an offer of settlement to Clients, and 
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they can not mutually agree on the terms of negotiated settlement of the Lawsuit, 
then the clients agree first to negotiate ill good faith. Failing an agreement then the 
parties agree to mediate their dispute before a mediator .. . 
a. In the event the dispute is not resolved by mediation, each of the two 
parties shall select an arbitrator and the two selected arbitrators shall select 
a third arbitrator ... 
b .... The decision of the three arbitrators whether to accept ofreject the 
pending offer shall be binding on the clients .. . 
Contingent Fee Agreement, Paragraph 7). 
Assignment of Control of Litigation. 
Assignment of rights to a legal claim, or chose in action, may include assignment of the 
right to control litigation of the claim, an<Vor assignment of property interest in the proceeds 
from the litigation. EMC argues the Agreements only grant CVWC an interest in the potential 
proceeds from the litigation, the Court disagrees. The Court finds that the Agreements grant 
CVWC and interest in botl1 controlling the litigation and in the potential proceeds from the 
litigation. The provisions of the Agreements requiring EMC to l)File the present lawsuit as a 
condition to settle the underlying litigation. 2)Be represented by a specific attorney agreed to by 
CVWC. 3) Allow the attorney to jointly represent EMC and CVWC in this case. 4)\Vaive client 
confidentiality with the attorney in this case lo allow SW to disclose information regarding the 
litigation to CVWC. 5)0btain prior approval by CVWC before it can settle the claim, or if the 
parties disagree, ultimately submit its rights to settle its case to binding arbitration. 
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The Settlement Agreement states it is integrated with the Contingent Fee Agreement. 
Therefore CVWC appears to have the ability to enforce these conditions, with the threat that 
EMC will suffer the consequences of a failed Settlement Agreement in the underlying case if 
EMC were to exercise independence in controlling its litigation decisions. Whether or not EMC 
and CVWC currently have any disagreements regarding these conditions is immaterial. It is 
sufficient for purposes of this motion that CVWC has the apparent ability to force EMC to forego 
its ability to independently control its litigation in the event a disagreement arises in the future. 
The Court :finds the Agreements transfer a substantial degree of control over litigation decisions 
from EMC to CVWC in the EMC) malpractice claim. 
Assignment of Property Interest 
The Agreements also grant CVWC a property interest in EMC's claim. The Agreements 
go beyond providing security for payment of the Settlement amount .in the underlying case. 
Instead of granting a security interest for a sum ce1tain, the Agreements grant an uncertain 
amount, based on a percentage of the total amow1t of recovery. The Agreements grants CVWC 
an interest in EMC's property rights. It also grants CVWC a pecuniary incentive to maximize the 
amount of recovery by EMC. 
The Settlement Agreement and Contingency Fee Agreement do not expressly assign the 
malpractice claim to CVWC. However, "the creation and existence of an assigmnent is to be 
determined according to the intention of the parties, which is to be discerned not only from the 
instruments executed by them, if an, but from tbe surrounding circumstances." 6A C.J.S. 
Assignments §57 (20 J 0). From the Agreements, and the apparent intent of the pariies the court 
finds that the Agreements constitute a partial assignment of EM C's malpractice claims. 
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Docs the Partial Assignment of Property Interests in and Partial Control of a 
Malpractice Claim Bar EMC from Pursuing the Claim? 
PKH argues that the public policies that would prohibit an assignment of EM Cs 
malpractice claim should also apply to tJ1is partial assignment. Whether assigning all or a part of 
a malpractice claim violates a public policy and bars the assignor from pursuing its claim is a 
matter of first impression in Utah. Neither of the parties were able to find a controlling Utah case 
on this point. Although P~H asks the court to rely on the 1999 Utah Supreme Court case of 
Snow v Tanasse, 1999 UT 49 for suppo11 the Court finds that case is not helpful. SnoH' sheds no 
light on the question of partial assignments, and expressly declines to address the question of 
whether malpractice claims are assignable in Utah. When the same case was previously before 
the Court of Appeals as Tanasse v Snow, the Court laid out the majority and minority positions 
on the issue of whether a malpractice claim is vohmtarily assignable, but the Appellate Court 
also expressly passed on deciding that issue for Utah. Where there is no controlling precedent, 
both parties have relied on the persuasiveness ofcases from other states. 
Majority Position: 
According to Snow v Tanasse, and Gurski v Rosenblum & Filian, 885 A.2d 163, states 
that have adopted the position that legal malpmctice claims are personal and can not be assigned 
include: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, lllinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevv Jersey, Nevada Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia. These 
states identify many overlapping public policy considerations including the unique and personal 
nature of the relationshjp between attorney and client, the need to preserve the sanctity of that 
relationship, confidentiality, and conflicts of interests among others, to support their adoption of 
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this majority position. 
Minoritv Position: 
According to Snow v Tanasse, states that adopted the position that legal malpractice 
claims are assignable include New York, Oregon and Pennsylvania. These states generally hold 
that legal malpractice claims are based on routine negligence or contract theories and should be 
assignable as are any routine tort or contract claim. 
Neither party argued that this Court should adopt the minority position. Because of the 
public policy issues supporting the non-assignability of legal malpractice claims, this court 
adopts the majority position. 
Public Policy Issues: 
The court considered the following public policy concerns and rulings by courts in other 
states regarding assignability of legal malpractice claims: 
Exploitation and merchandising of malpractice claims. "It is the unique quality 
of legal services, the personal nature of the attorney's duty to the client and the 
confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship that invoke public policy 
considerations in our conclusion that malpractice claims should not be subject to 
assignment. The assignment of such claims could relegate the legal malpractice 
action to the market place and convert it to a commodity to be exploited and 
transferred to economic bidders who have never had a professional relationship 
with the attorney and to whom the attorney has never owed a legal duty, and who 
have never had any prior connection with the assignor or his rights. The 
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commercial aspect of assignability of choses in action arising oul of legal 
malpractice is rife with probabilities that could only debase the legal profession," 
(See, Goodley v Wank & Wank, 62 Cal. App. Jd 389) 
Preservation of the S;mctity of the client-lawyer relationship. "The assig11ment 
of a legal malpractice claim is perhaps most incompatible with the attorney's duty 
of loyalty. An attorney's loyalty is likely to be weakened by the knowledge that a 
client can sell off a malpractice claim, particularly if an adversary can buy it. If an 
attorney is providing zealous representation to a client, the client's adversary will 
likely be motivated to strike back at the attorney in any permissible fashion. If an 
adversary can retaliate by buying up a client's malpractice action, attorneys will 
begin to rethink the wisdom of zealous advocacy. A legal system that discourages 
loyalty to the client, disserves that client." "Unlike any other commercial 
transaction, the client-lawyer relationship is structured to function within an 
adversarial legal system. In order to operate within this system, the relationship 
must do more than bind together a client and a lawyer. 1t must also work to repel 
attacks from legal adversaries. TI10se who are not privy to the relationship are 
often purposefully excll1ded because they are pursujng interests adverse to the 
client's interests." (See, Picadilly, inc. v Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338) For example, 
EMC's relationship with PKH was maintained for one purpose, to defeat 
CVWC's suit against EMC CVWC was the antagonist who by initialing its 
lawsuit against EMC drove EMC to seek out the protection offered by the 
client-lawyer relationship with PKH. 
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Opportunity for Collusion. One compelling argument against assignment is that 
"[p ]ermitting an assignment of a legal malpractice claim to the adversary in the 
underlying litigation that gave rise to the legal malpractice claim ... creates the 
opportunity and incentive for collusion in stipulating to damages in exchange for 
an agreement not to execute on the judgment in the underlying litigation. it (See, 
Gurski, 885 A.2d at 174). Nothing prevents the parties from stipulating to 
artificially inflated damages that could serve as the basis for unjustly high 
damages in the 'trial within a trial' phase of the subsequent malpractice action. 
While it is not necessary to find that the consent judgment in the underlying 
litigation was the product of collusion or that the stipulated damages were 
unreasonable, the Cou1t "merely observes that the opportunity and incentive for 
collusion were certainly present." (.'Jee, Kommavongsa v. Haskeli, 67 P.3d at. 
l 077). 
An abrupt and shameless shift of positions in the malpractice case. "The trial 
of this assigned malpractice claim would feature a public and disreputable role 
reversal. The mechanics of trying this case would magnify the least attractive 
aspects of the legal system . . .. Because of the unique nature of the trial within a 
trial [the] change in position would be obvious to all the jmors hearing the 
evidence .... They would rightly leave the courtroom with less regard for the law 
a11d the legal profession than they had when they entered." Picadilly, Inc. v. 
Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338. 
No distinction between as assignment of ll cause of action ancl an assignment 
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of recovery. Courts have found a "meaningless distinction" between an 
assignment of a cause of action and an assignment of recovery from such an 
action, which distinction is made merely to circumvent the public policy barring 
assignments (See, Town & Courwy Bank v Country Mutual Ins., 121 Ill. App. 3d 
216 and Gurski v Rosenblum & Filian, 885 A.2d 163). 
The court recognizes that each of these are important public concerns that oppose the 
assignability of malpractice claims. These public policy concerns, combined with the parties 
failure to present suppo1i for the minority position, are sufficient to persuade the Court to adopt 
the majority position that malpractice claims should not be assignable. The Court also agrees 
with the reasoning of the Court in Town & Country that" ... the distinction between the 
assignment of a cause of action for personal injuries and the assignment of the expectancy of 
recovery from such an action [is] a fiction not necessary to support some public policy ... and 
[the Court] will not adopt this meaningless distinction to circumvent that public policy. If the 
assigm11ent of the cause of action is void, the assignment of the expectancy of the proceeds is 
also void." 
Although there is no express assignment of the claim in this case, it is obvious that the 
Agreements transfer to CYWC a substantial level of EMC control over the litigation decisioris 
and a substantial portion of EMC's property rights. Although the Contingenc.y Fee Agreement 
was drafted to state, "the parties agree," the Contingency Fee Agreement and the Settlement 
Agreement are merged, establishing the potential that a violation of the Contingency Fee 




Based on the assignment of substantial control over litigation decisions and m1 interest in 
the potential proceeds of the cunent litigation the court finds the Agreements violate public 
policy. 
EMC May Pursue its Claims Under Certain Conditions. 
Nothing in this or<;ler prohibits EMC from pursuing its claims against PKH for 
malpractice. However, EMC may not do so under the restrictions placed on it by the Agreements. 
Similar to the decision in Davis v Scott, 320 S.W. 3d 87, the Court finds that EMC "has not 
forfeited its claim, but [the Court] can not ignore the fact that the present suit is born of the ... 
assigmuent and is, therefore, tainted in some respect." EMC is permitted to pursue its claim 
against PKH if it satisfies the Court that it will be prosecuted independently of the settlement 
agreement. To do so, at a minimum, EMC needs to establish that its litigation is not controlled in 
any way by CVWC, and that EMC is not represented by attorneys associated \vlth CVWC. 
ORDER 
EM C's complaint against PKH is dismissed without prejudice. EMC may re-file its 
claims against PKH if it establishes that it is not controlled in any way by CVWC and is not 
represented by attorneys associated with CVWC. 
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